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Article
How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Testimony in a Criminal Case
RICHARD A. WISE, CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & MARTIN A. SAFER
This Article describes a method for analyzing the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony that will significantly enhance the ability of the
criminal justice system to assess eyewitness accuracy. The method
consists of the following components: First, ascertain whether law
enforcement conducted the eyewitness interviews in a manner that
obtained the maximum amount of informationfrom the eyewitness, did not
contaminate the eyewitness's memory of the crime, or artificially increase
the eyewitness's confidence. Next, determine whether the identification
procedures in the case were fair and unbiased Finally, evaluate what
eyewitness factors during the crime are likely to have increased or
decreased the accuracy of the eyewitness testimony. The Article discusses
scientific guidelines for assessing the fairness of eyewitness interviews and
identification procedures, and a list of eyewitness factors that most
commonly affect eyewitness accuracy in criminal trials. The Appendix
contains a form that will aid participants in the criminal justice system in
applying this method to eyewitness testimony in criminal cases. By
implementing this method, the criminal justice system will significantly
reduce wrongful convictions from eyewitness error.
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How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Testimony in a Criminal Case
RICHARD A. WISE, CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & MARTIN A. SAFER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 1984, Jennifer Thompson, a 22-year-old college student,
awoke around 3:00 a.m. to find someone in her apartment. When she
asked who was there, a man jumped on her, pinned her arms to the side of
her head, put a knife to her throat, and raped her. Despite her terror, she
was determined to identify her rapist so he would pay for his crimes. Once
her eyes adjusted to the dark, she used the light coming through her blinds
and bedroom window, as well as her nightlight to see if he had any tattoos,
scars, unusual jewelry, how he parted his hair, what he was wearing, and
anything else that would be useful in identifying him. She made sure that
when he allowed her to stand up she stood close to him so she could
determine how tall he was.'
During her long ordeal, Jennifer tried maneuvering him into different
positions where she could best use the available light in her apartment to
see him. At one point, he bent down and turned on her stereo, and a blue
light from the stereo illuminated his face. When he permitted Jennifer to
go to the bathroom, she turned on the light and had an opportunity for a
moment to get a good look at his face. She also managed to briefly turn on
a lamp in the bedroom before he ordered her to turn if off. Jennifer told
her assailant that she was thirsty so she would have an excuse to go to the
kitchen. In the kitchen, she turned on the light, which gave her another
opportunity to see her assailant. Summoning her courage, wrapped only in
a blanket, Jennifer ran from her kitchen to a neighbor's house. The rapist
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1MARK COSTANZO, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LAW 170 (2004); Helen O'Neill, The Power of
Faith: Eleven Years After Jennifer Thompson's Mistaken Testimony Sent Him to Jail, Ronald Cotton's
Spirit of Forgiveness Let Them Be Friends, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 2000, at B06.
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did not follow, but that same night, he broke into another apartment and
raped a second woman.2
With the help of a police sketch artist, Jennifer created a composite
drawing of the rapist: an African American, in his twenties with short hair
and a thin moustache. The police widely circulated the composite drawing
and received several calls from people who thought they recognized the
rapist. Based on the calls, the police created a six-person photo array for
Jennifer, including all the suspects they had in the case. After studying the
photo array for a few minutes, Jennifer identified Ronald Cotton, an
employee at a local seafood restaurant, as the rapist. The police responded:
"We thought this might be the one," because Ronald Cotton had a prior
3conviction for sexual assault, and they knew that he liked white women.
When Ronald Cotton learned that the police were looking for him, he
went to the police station to clear up the matter. Unfortunately, Ronald
Cotton did not help himself during his interrogation. He was nervous; he
got his dates mixed up, and his alibi did not check out. Furthermore, a
piece of foam was missing from one of his shoes, and a similar piece of
foam from a shoe was found at the crime scene. The police arrested him
for both rapes and placed him in a seven person lineup. Jennifer had little
difficulty identifying him from the lineup, but the second rape victim
identified a foil from the lineup. The police informed Jennifer that she had
identified the same man from the lineup whose photo she had picked out
from the photo array a few days earlier.4
At trial, the only physical evidence the prosecution produced to
connect Ronald Cotton to the crime was the piece of foam found at the
crime scene and that he owned a flashlight that resembled the one used by
the rapist. Jennifer, however, was a "terrific witness." During the crimes,
she had made every possible effort to see her rapist, and she had identified
him twice, once from a photo array and once from a lineup. Moreover, she
was completely confident that she had the right man and told the jury that
she had no doubt that Ronald Cotton was the rapist. The jury found
Ronald Cotton guilty of rape. On January 17, 1985, when Cotton was
sentenced to life in prison, Jennifer toasted his sentence with champagne.
She said that "[i]t was the happiest day of [her] life."5
After spending two years in prison, Ronald Cotton learned from an
inmate that another inmate, Bobby Poole, was bragging that he was the
man who had raped Jennifer Thompson and the other woman. Cotton was
eventually granted a new trial because the North Carolina Supreme Court
ruled that the trial court had erred in not permitting the jury to learn that
2 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 170.
3 Id.; O'Neill, supra note 1.
4 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 170; O'Neill, supra note 1.
5 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 170-71; O'Neill, supra note 1.
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the second rape victim had failed to identify him from the lineup.6
In November of 1987, Cotton was retried, this time for both rapes,
because the second rape victim had decided by the time of the second trial
that Cotton was her rapist despite her failure to pick him out of a lineup
several years earlier. Both Jennifer and the second rape victim told the
jury that they were positive that Ronald Cotton was the rapist. The judge
excluded testimony during the trial that Bobby Poole had admitted to
committing the rapes. The jury found Ronald Cotton guilty, and he was
given two life sentences. Cotton's appellate attorney failed to assert that
the trial court's exclusion of Poole's confession constituted prejudicial
error. Cotton's new convictions were affirmed.7
For the next eight years, Cotton wrote letters to anyone he thought
might help him get his convictions overturned. He likely would have died
in prison if Richard Rosen, a law professor and attorney, had not decided
to investigate his case. Rosen and another attorney filed a motion for
appropriate relief on the basis of inadequate representation during his
second appeal. They also filed a motion for DNA testing, which was
granted in October of 1994. The DNA evidence from one victim was too
deteriorated to be conclusive, but the DNA samples from the other victim
showed that Cotton was not the rapist. At his defense attorneys' request,
the DNA samples were sent to the state's DNA database, which contains
DNA from all convicted felons in North Carolina. The DNA samples from
the crimes matched the DNA of Bobby Poole. After learning of the DNA
results, the district attorney joined with Cotton's defense attorneys in
moving to dismiss all charges against Ronald Cotton. In July of 1995, the
Governor of North Carolina officially pardoned Ronald Cotton.
Having spent two years wracked with guilt after learning that she
identified the wrong man, Jennifer asked the detective in charge of the case
to arrange a meeting for her with Ronald Cotton. An Associated Press
reporter described their meeting:
A few weeks later, she drove 50 miles to a church in the town
where she was raped. She asked her husband and the pastor
to leave. Trembling, she opened the door. She had prayed
for the strength to face this moment. She had prayed for the
strength to face this man. "I'm sorry," she said. "If I spent
every day for the rest of my life telling you how sorry I am, it
wouldn't come close to what I feel." Ronald Cotton was
calm and quiet, and Thompson thought he seemed so very
6 State v. Cotton, 351 S.E.2d 277, 280 (N.C. 1987); O'Neill, supra note 1.
'State v. Cotton, 394 S.E.2d 456, 457, 460 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); see also O'Neill, supra note 1.
8 See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T JUST., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 44
(1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.
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tall. Finally, he spoke. "I'm not mad at you," he said softly.
"I've never been mad at you. I just want you to have a good
life." Tears falling, Thompson looked into his eyes and knew
she would never see him in her nightmares again.9
This case produced several tragedies. Jennifer endured the terrible ordeal
of the rape; she is still afraid sometimes, especially at night when she is
alone, and she had to deal with the guilt of convicting the wrong man.
Ronald Cotton was imprisoned for eleven agonizing years for crimes he
did not commit. Additional crimes could have been prevented if Bobby
Poole had been arrested earlier. The prosecutor, police, defense attorneys,
jurors, and judges have to live with the knowledge that they are responsible
for sending an innocent man to prison for eleven years. This case
illustrates both the power and the danger of erroneous eyewitness
testimony.10
Each year, thousands of men and women in the United States are
wrongfully convicted of felonies that they did not commit."t Experts
estimate that eyewitness error plays a role in half or more of all wrongful
felony convictions.1 2  A study published in 2006 showed that eyewitness
9 O'Neill, supra note 1. Jennifer Thompson and Ronald Cotton became good friends. She said of
Ronald Cotton, "He is an amazing human being. He has been a real good teacher for me." Id Jennifer
Thompson has become a strong opponent of the death penalty and frequently speaks about the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony. Id.
10 See COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 171-72; CONNORS ET AL., supra note 8, at 43-44; What
Jennifer Saw, Transcript from Interview with Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/dna/interviews/cotton.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2009) (discussing the case and Cotton's
experience with the North Carolina judicial system).
11 Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Survey of Judges' Knowledge and Beliefs About
Eyewitness Testimony, 40 CT. REV. 6, 6 (2003) (explaining that estimates of the number of wrongful
felony convictions range from 5000 to as many as 100,000 per year with DNA exoneration cases
suggesting that the number of wrongful felony convictions is closer to the upper limit of this estimate);
see also D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 761, 780 (2007) (discussing a study that used the
DNA exoneration cases to estimate that in 3.3% to 5% of the capital rape-murder convictions in the
U.S. from 1982-89, the defendants were innocent). If this percentage of wrongful convictions were
applicable to other types of crimes, there would be 33,000 to 50,000 wrongful felony convictions per
year in the United States.
12 See C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Convictions: Societal Tolerance of Injustice, 4 RES. IN SOC.
PROBS. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 103 (1987) ("In our own database, eyewitness error was involved in nearly
60 percent of the cases."); Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 289
(1988); see also Garrett L. Berman & Brian L. Cutler, Effects of Inconsistencies in Eyewitness
Testimony on Mock-Juror Decision Making, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 170, 170 (1996) ("False
eyewitness identifications . . . appear to be one of the leading causes of erroneous conviction."
(citations omitted)); Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the
Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 112
(2002); Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2005) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)); Gary
L. Wells et at., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and
Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 605 (1998) ("In addition to the experimental literature, cases
of proven wrongful convictions of innocent people have consistently shown that mistaken eyewitness
identification is responsible for more of these wrongful convictions than all the other causes
combined."); Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, How Mistaken and
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error occurred in seventy-five percent or more of the first 180 DNA
exoneration cases.' 3  In several of the DNA cases, more than one
eyewitness made an erroneous identification, and a number of the
defendants were sentenced to death.' 4  Unfortunately, DNA testing can
correct only a small fraction of eyewitness misidentifications because it is
only available in a small number of criminal cases. 5
One of the principal reasons that eyewitness error is the leading cause
of wrongful convictions is because it is one of the most powerful types of
evidence that can be presented against a criminal defendant.' 6  As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote in Kampshoff
v. Smith:
There can be no reasonable doubt that inaccurate
Perjured Eyewitness Identification Testimony Put 46 Innocent Americans on Death Row,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/aboutus/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2009)
[hereinafter Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions]. Indeed, Edwin Borchard identified erroneous eyewitness
identification as a leading cause of false conviction over seventy years ago. EDWIN M. BORCHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT xiii (1932).
13 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI.
PuB. INT. 45, 48 (2006); see also Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 638-39 (1999) ("A Department of Justice study found that, out of a sample
of more than 21,000 cases, DNA testing exonerated the suspect in 23% of the cases."). Since DNA
evidence was first introduced into the criminal justice system, it has exonerated more than 144 people
who were wrongfully convicted of crimes. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States,
1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005). "In 64% percent of these
exonerations (219/340) at least one eyewitness misidentified the defendant." Id. at 542. Eighty-eight
percent of the rape exonerations involved eyewitness misidentification. Id at 530; see also Gary L.
Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 278 (2003) (stating
that more than 100 convicted felons have been exonerated by DNA evidence).
14 The Northwestern University School of Law Center on Wrongful Convictions released a study
in 2001 involving wrongful convictions in capital cases throughout the United States. Of the eighty-six
cases studied, the Center found that "53.5%[] had been predicated in whole or part on mistaken or
perjured eyewitness testimony. In thirty-three ofthe cases, the eyewitness testimony was the sole basis
of the conviction." Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, supra note 12; see also WAYNE WErrEN,
PSYCHOLOGY: THEMES AND VARIATIONS, BRIEFER VERSION 230 (7th ed. 2008) (describing the near-
conviction of an innocent priest based on the testimony of seven eyewitnesses); Wells et al., Eyewitness
Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 605 (stating that of forty cases overturned by DNA
evidence in the 1990s, five of the exonerated inmates were on death row, and "36 (or 90%) involved
eyewitness identification evidence in which one or more eyewitnesses falsely identified the person").
13 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 49 ("In contrast to sexual assault cases,
only a small fraction of murders (more than 16,000 reported in 2004) and almost no robberies (more
than 400,000 reported in 2004) or aggravated assaults (more than 850,000 reported in 2004) result in
biologically rich trace evidence left behind."); Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station,
A Successful Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 589 (2000)
("Perpetrators of murders, drive-by shootings, convenience store robberies, muggings, and other
common crimes almost never leave DNA trace evidence that could exonerate someone who has been
the [sic] mistakenly identified by an eyewitness.").
16 As one study on eyewitness testimony explained:
An eyewitness who says "That is the person I saw pull the gun" is providing direct
evidence of guilt in the sense that the criminal act and the defendant are directly
linked. In contrast, physical evidence such as fingerprints indicate only that the
suspect touched a given surface at some point in time, perhaps for reasons unrelated
to the crime, and hence is circumstantial evidence.
Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 604.
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eyewitness testimony may be one of the most prejudicial
features of a criminal trial. Juries, naturally desirous to
punish a vicious crime, may well be unschooled in the effects
that the subtle compound of suggestion, anxiety, and
forgetfulness in the face of the need to recall often has on
witnesses. Accordingly, doubts over the strength of the
evidence of a defendant's guilt may be resolved on the basis
of the eyewitness' seeming certainty when he points to the
defendant and exclaims with conviction that veils all doubt,
"[T]hat's the man!' 17
The prevalence of eyewitness error poses a major dilemma for the
criminal justice system because it is frequently the only or primary
evidence available in a criminal case. For instance, a 1987 study estimated
that in 77,000 criminal trials each year in the United States, the primary or
sole evidence against a defendant is eyewitness testimony.' 8 As evidenced
by the Ronald Cotton case described in this Introduction, criminal cases
where eyewitness testimony is the sole or primary evidence pose the
greatest risk that eyewitness error will result in a wrongful conviction.' 9
Therefore, it is essential that the criminal justice system institute reforms to
increase the reliability and accuracy of eyewitness testimony. As is
explained below, improving judges' and attorneys' abilities to assess the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony would significantly reduce eyewitness
error. This Article delineates a method for analyzing the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony that will enable judges and attorneys to achieve this
vital goal.
Part II of this Article describes the current state of the law concerning
eyewitness identifications. Part III examines the major causes of
eyewitness error. Part IV explains why the ability to assess the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony in criminal cases is essential to the proper
performance of judges' and attorneys' duties. Part V describes a three-part
method for analyzing the accuracy of eyewitness testimony that will
significantly enhance judges' and attorneys' abilities to evaluate
eyewitness accuracy. This method consists of the following components:
(1) judges and attorneys determine if law enforcement conducted the
eyewitness interviews in a manner that obtained the maximum amount of
17 Kampshoffv. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 585 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
18 Daniel Goleman, Studies Point to Flaws in Lineups of Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1995, at
Cl.
19 Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 807, 842 (2007); see also Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note
12, at 609 (stating that the only safeguard that has demonstrated any efficacy in educating jurors about
eyewitness testimony-expert testimony-is often not used by defendants because of its cost). For
further discussion of the difficulties in using expert testimony, see infra notes 84-90 and accompanying
text.
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information from the eyewitness, did not contaminate the eyewitness's
memory of the crime, or artificially increase the eyewitness's confidence;
(2) they ascertain if the identification procedures in the case were fair and
unbiased; and (3) they examine the eyewitness factors during the crime
that likely increased or decreased the accuracy of the eyewitness
testimony.
Part VI sets forth scientific guidelines for evaluating whether an
eyewitness interview obtained the maximum amount of information from
the eyewitness, did not contaminate an eyewitness's memory of a crime, or
artificially increased the eyewitness's confidence. Part VII details
scientific guidelines for appraising the fairness of identification
procedures. Part VIII describes common eyewitness factors present during
crimes that affect eyewitness accuracy. Part IX sets forth a modified
standard for determining when eyewitness identifications should be
admissible at trial. Part X makes some concluding remarks about using
this method to analyze the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. The
Appendix to this Article contains a form that will aid judges and attorneys
in applying this method when evaluating eyewitness accuracy in criminal
cases.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Between 1967 and 1977, the United States Supreme Court rendered
several decisions that considered the constitutional implications of various
identification procedures. The Court has not rendered any significant
decisions on identification procedures since then. As a result, certain
principles are firmly established in the case law, while other issues are
addressed only briefly or not at all.
A. Pretrial and In-Court Identifications: Legal Categories and Principles
In the typical criminal case in which the defendant denies he or she
was the perpetrator, two evidentiary issues will generally arise whenever
the prosecutor calls an eyewitness at trial. 20 First, will the prosecutor be
permitted to elicit testimony about the eyewitness's pretrial
identification(s) of the defendant?2' Second, will the eyewitness be
permitted to make an in-court identification during the trial?22  These
20 Similar issues sometimes arise regarding an eyewitness's ability to recognize and identify a
defendant's voice, but that subject is beyond the scope of this Article. For a detailed discussion of this
topic, see CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. McKENNA, 2 WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING:
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE §§ 38:4-38:5 (3d ed. 2008).
2, Such testimony might come from the eyewitness or from the police officer who conducted the
pretrial identification procedure, or both.
' The in-court identification may be a moment of high drama, but its evidentiary value is suspect
because anyone familiar with an American courtroom will, in most cases, be able to identify the
defendant simply by observing where he or she is sitting.
2009)
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issues are generally resolved in a hearing prior to the trial.23
The Supreme Court has long been aware of the dangers posed by
24
suggestive identification procedures. Yet, rather than create a single set
of rules and standards to govern such cases, the Court has divided
identification issues into two categories, one quite narrow and the other
quite broad, and has applied very different legal principles to each. The
narrow category involves only pretrial identification procedures which (a)
were corporeal in nature, i.e., the witness viewed the defendant "live"; (b)
were conducted after the defendant was arraigned on the charge in
question; and (c) were conducted in the absence of the defendant's
attorney. The second, broader category includes all other pretrial
identification procedures: corporeal identifications prior to arraignment
and photo identifications, whether before or after arraignment.
1. Corporeal, Post-Arraignment Identifications Held in the Absence
of Counsel United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California
Once a defendant has been arraigned, the defendant enjoys the right,
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, to have counsel present during all
"critical stages" of the case, whether they occur prior to or during the
trial.25 In 1967, in United States v. Wade2 and Gilbert v. California,27 the
Supreme Court held that a lineup or other identification procedure in which
the defendant is forced to participate is a "critical stage," and that to hold
such a lineup in the absence of defense counsel violates that right.2
If that right is violated, the Court held that the prosecutor is not
23 See discussion infra Part I.C.
24 "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife
with instances of mistaken identification." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); see also
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,264 (1967).
25 The Court first used the phrase "critical stage" in connection with the right to counsel in Parker
v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 575 (1948), and first specified that counsel must be provided to a defendant at
a "critical stage" of a criminal prosecution in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961). The
phrase occurs with regularity in discussions of the right to counsel: a December 2008 Westlaw search
of the Supreme Court database, "'critical stage' w/p counsel attorney," produced 65 "hits."
26 Wade was convicted of robbing a federally insured bank. Wade, 388 U.S. at 218.
27 Gilbert was convicted of robbing a state bank, and of murdering a police officer who happened
to enter the bank during the robbery. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 263.
2' Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272. "[T]he confrontation compelled by the
State between the accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is
peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially,
derogate from a fair trial." Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. After discussing the risks of misidentification and,
particularly, the risks involved in suggestive identification procedures, the Court commented:
It is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused
at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the
issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all practical
purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.
Id. at 229 (citation omitted).
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permitted to elicit testimony about the lineup at trial.29 Moreover, an
eyewitness who identified the defendant at a post-arraignment lineup
conducted in the absence of counsel will not be permitted to make an in-
court identification at trial, unless the prosecutor can "establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon
observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification., 30 In other
words, the prosecutor must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the eyewitness remembered the defendant from the crime itself and was
not relying on his or her memory of the lineup to make the in-court
identification.3'
2. All Other Pretrial Identification Procedures: The "Due Process"
Standard
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has considered the
constitutional implications of identification procedures in a variety of
contexts not covered by the Wade and Gilbert decisions.
In Kirby v. Illinois, police conducted a pre-arraignment one-person
corporeal "showup. ' '32 The Court declined to apply the Wade-Gilbert rule
to this situation because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
exist prior to arraignment.33 Instead, the Court enunciated a different test,
based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.34 In United States v. Ash, the Court likewise declined to
apply the Wade-Gilbert rule to a post-arraignment use of a photo array
35
because the use of photos does not involve an actual, live "confrontation"
between the defendant and law enforcement officials and their witnesses.36
29 "Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that
law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel
at the critical lineup." Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
30 Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.
31 See id. at 242.
32 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684-85 (1972). In a "showup" the eyewitness is only shown
the suspect. In contrast, in a lineup, the suspect is one of several people standing in an array, and the
eyewitness is asked if the perpetrator is in the lineup. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
In Kirby, a police officer escorted a robbery victim to a room in a police station where Kirby, a
codefendant, and two police officers were seated. The escorting officer asked if they were the robbers
and the victim said that they were. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 684-85.
3 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90. Four Justices dissented, with Justice Brennan accusing the plurality
of valuing the "mere formalism" of the pre- vs. post-arraignment distinction over what he considered
the fundamental unfairness of the result the Court permitted. Id. at 698-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
34 The Court held that due process of law "forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification." Id. at 691.
35 A photo array is like a lineup; an eyewitness is shown photographs of several individuals and is
asked whether the perpetrator's picture is among them.
36 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973). The Court also cited a second reason: defense
counsel has no right to be present when a prosecutor prepares his or her eyewitnesses to testify, and
showing photographs to an eyewitness was simply one aspect of such preparation. Id. at 317-18.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas, dissented: "[Tioday's decision marks
simply another step towards the complete evisceration of the fundamental constitutional principles
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In Simmons v. United States and Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court
considered the constitutional implications of pre-arraignment, highly
suggestive photograph identifications.37 In Simmons,38 the Court held that
a due process test should be applied to determine whether the suggestive
pretrial procedure should prohibit the eyewitness from making an in-court
identification at trial.39 In Brathwaite, the Court held that even if the photo
identification was highly and unnecessarily suggestive,40 a due process test
should be applied to assess the admissibility of both the pretrial and in-
court identifications.4'
In Neil v. Biggers, a pre-indictment, corporeal showup case,42 the Court
issued its most elaborate commentarT on "the relationship between
suggestiveness and misidentification, '4  and on the due process to be
applied in cases not covered by the Sixth Amendment Wade-Gilbert rule.
As to "suggestiveness," the Court stated:
It is, first of all, apparent that the primary evil to be avoided
is "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification." While the phrase was coined as a
standard for determining whether an in-court identification
would be admissible in the wake of a suggestive out-of-court
identification, with the deletion of "irreparable" it serves
equally well as a standard for the admissibility of testimony
concerning the out-of-court identification itself. It is the
likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's
right to due process. . . Suggestive confrontations are
disapproved because they increase the likelihood of
misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are
established by this Court, only six years ago, in United States v. Wade." Id. at 326 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted). The first step, in Justice Brennan's view, was the Kirby
decision. See id. at 326 n.1.37 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1968); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 103-04 (1977).
38 Shortly after a bank robbery, Simmons became a suspect. FBI agents obtained from relatives
several photos of Simmons and others and showed them to eyewitnesses, who identified him as one of
the robbers. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 380-81. At trial, the eyewitnesses made in-court identifications, but
the prosecutor did not offer evidence about the pretrial photo identifications. Id at 382.
39 1d. at 384.
40 An undercover officer purchased narcotics from a man he had never seen before, then described
him to a back-up officer. That officer, believing Brathwaite fit the description, left a mug shot of
Brathwaite for the undercover officer, who identified him as the seller. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 99-
101.
41 Id. at 113-14.
42 Seven months after she was raped by a stranger, the complainant identified the defendant at a
station-house showup. She had gotten a good look at the perpetrator during her ordeal, and in the
intervening time, had viewed, in showups, lineups, and photographs, numerous other suspects, without
identifying any of them. The police conducted a showup of Biggers after making efforts to find look-
alikes for a lineup, efforts which the Supreme Court found unimpressive. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 193-95, 199 (1972).43 1d. at 198.
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condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of
misidentification is gratuitous. But . . . the admission of
evidence of a showup without more does not violate due
process.44
The Court also delineated in Biggers five factors that should be considered
in assessing whether the facts present "a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification" '45 and based on these factors concluded that it
did not. Thus, it held that testimony about the showup and the in-court
identification were both admissible, despite the unnecessarily suggestive
nature of the showup.46 The Court subsequently affirmed the Biggers rule
in Brathwaite, its most recent significant identification case. 7
In essence, therefore, the due process standard is an all-or-nothing test.
If the pretrial identification process for an eyewitness was suggestive and
the totality of the circumstances convinces the judge that it created a
substantial likelihood of misidentification, then no evidence of that
eyewitness's pretrial identification of the defendant can be introduced at
trial; nor can that eyewitness make an in-court identification of the
defendant.48 On the other hand, if the judge concludes that the eyewitness
made the identification based on his memory of the crime, then even if the
pretrial identification procedure was suggestive, the judge will deny the
motion, and permit both testimony about the eyewitness's pretrial
identification of the defendant, and the in-court identification.49
3. The Supreme Court's Discussion of Accuracy Factors
In Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite, the Supreme Court held
that the reliability of an eyewitness's identification is to be determined by
the "totality of the circumstances." 50 In these decisions, the Supreme Court
delineated five eyewitness factors that the trier of fact should consider
when evaluating eyewitness accuracy: (1) the eyewitness's opportunity to
4Id. at 198 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384). The prosecutor in Simmons did not offer
evidence of the photo identification.45 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198; see infra text accompanying note 50 (setting forth the "totality of the
circumstances" test from Biggers and Brathwaite).
4 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99.
47 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 113-14 (1977). See supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text (describing the facts of the case and the holding).
48 The Court found identification procedures to violate due process in Foster v. California. 394
U.S. 440, 443 (1969). An eyewitness failed to identify Foster the first time he confronted him, despite
a suggestive lineup, and could only make a tentative identification at a showup, then made a positive
identification at yet another lineup. The Court held it was error to allow any identification testimony in
the case. Id. at 442-43.
49 Thus, in Kirby, Biggers, and Brathwaite, the Court held that, despite suggestiveness, pretrial
and in-court identifications were both permissible. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972);
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 115-16. In Foster, by contrast, the Court held
that neither should have been admitted. Foster, 394 U.S. at 442-43.
50 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)); Biggers,
409 U.S. at 199.
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view the perpetrator during the crime; (2) the length of time between the
crime and the subsequent identification; (3) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (4) the accuracy of the
eyewitness's prior description of the criminal; and (5) the eyewitness's
degree of attention during the crime.5 In the years immediately following
these decisions, courts in most states adopted the approach enunciated in
Biggers and Brathwaite.52
B. Assessment of the Supreme Court's Approach to Eyewitness Error
In its case law concerning eyewitness identifications, the Supreme
Court considered four issues. First, when does a defendant have a right to
the presence of counsel at an eyewitness identification procedure? Second,
what rule should govern the admissibility of an unnecessarily suggestive
eyewitness identification procedure? Third, what factors should a court
consider in deciding whether to admit testimony about a pretrial
eyewitness identification, and an in-court identification of the defendant by
the eyewitness? Fourth, what burden of proof should the prosecutor satisfy
to secure the admissibility of eyewitness identifications? We will not
address the first issue in this Article.53
As to its resolution of the other three issues, the Court's decisions
about them predated the vast majority of scientific research on eyewitness
testimony. 54  For example, the factors listed in Biggers and Brathwaite
"constitute 'educated guesses' by the Court on how [these five eyewitness
factors] affect identification accuracy." 55 Subsequent scientific research
has shown that many of these five factors do not affect eyewitness
51 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
52 See, e.g., State v. Bracy, 703 P.2d 464, 474 (Ariz. 1985); Chism v. State, 853 S.W.2d 255, 261
(Ark. 1993); People v. Clark, 833 P.2d 561, 612 (Cal. 1992); People v. Weller, 679 P.2d 1077, 1083
(Colo. 1984); State v. Miller, 522 A.2d 249, 253-54 (Conn. 1987); Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546,
550 (Del. 1985); Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 672 (D.C. 1993); State v. Bennett, 610 P.2d
502, 507-08 (Haw. 1980); State v. Hoisington, 657 P.2d 17, 25 (Idaho 1983); People v. Miller, 626
N.E.2d 1350, 1356-57 (Il. App. Ct. 1993); Hamlet v. State, 490 N.E.2d 715, 720 (Ind. 1986); State v.
Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 575 (Kan. 2003) (citing Holden v. State, 602 P.2d 452, 455-56 (Alaska 1979));
State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1240-41 (Kan. 1981); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 854,
857 (Ky. 1985); State v. Robinson, 386 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (La. 1980); State v. Rolls, 599 A.2d 421,
423 (Me. 1991); State v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Mont. 1983); State v. Whittey, 591 A.2d 1326,
1327-28 (N.H. 1991); State v. Maes, 665 P.2d 1169, 1173 (N.M. 1983); State v. Richardson, 402
S.E.2d 401, 404-05 (N.C. 1991); State v. Packineau, 423 N.W.2d 148, 149-50 (N.D. 1988); State v.
Classen, 590 P.2d 1198, 1203-04 (Or. 1979); State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249, 1253 (R.I. 1992); State
v. Stewart, 272 S.E.2d 628, 629-30 (S.C. 1980); Collins v. State, 626 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); State v. Short, 698 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Maupin, 822 P.2d
355, 360-61 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Mosley, 307 N.W.2d 200,210 (Wis. 1981).
53 We believe the Court decided this issue correctly. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches only after arraignment and should not be read to require a prosecutor to invite defense counsel
to his office during the prosecutor's pretrial preparations with an eyewitness. See supra note 31. This
issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article, and no further discussion of it is offered herein.
54 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 815.
53 Id.
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accuracy the way the Supreme Court believed they do.56 These five factors
are also deficient because they do not include many other eyewitness
factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.57  Additional serious flaws in
Biggers and Brathwaite include that: (1) the decisions do not take into
account how the eyewitness interviews impacted eyewitness accuracy; (2)
the decisions mistakenly assume that in all cases it can be determined
whether an identification from a suggestive identification procedure is
reliable; (3) three of the criteria (certainty, view, and attention) are self-
reported by the eyewitness, and a suggestive identification procedure can
increase an eyewitness's confidence, cause the eyewitness to believe that
he or she paid more attention to the perpetrator during the crime, and had a
better view of the crime than he or she actually had;58 and (4) the decisions
ignore that both eyewitness memory and confidence are highly malleable.59
This theme is developed more fully in Parts III and VII of this Article.
In sum, the due process standard and procedures the Supreme Court
promulgated in Kirby, Ash, Biggers, and Brathwaite for assessing
identification accuracy in criminal cases, including its five factor test, are
seriously flawed and in fact may contribute to, rather than reduce, the
number of wrongful convictions.60
In recognition of these flaws and shortcomings, a number of states
have moved away from the Supreme Court's due process approach.6'
Some state courts, applying their state constitution's due process clause,
have revised the Biggers-Brathwaite standards.6P Other states have
16 Id. at 816-18.
" Id at 818-19.
58 Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the
Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
1, 1(2009).
59 See discussion infra Part VI (addressing the importance of analyzing eyewitness interviews to
determine if law enforcement obtained the maximum amount of information from the eyewitness,
contaminated the eyewitness's memory of the crime, or increased the eyewitness confidence, and why
the harmful effects of a biased eyewitness interview or identification procedure cannot be corrected).
60 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 819.
61 The discussion in the rest of this paragraph is based in part on Wells & Quinlivan, supra note
58, at 18-21.
62 For example, in State v. Long, Utah's Supreme Court observed that "several of the criteria
listed by the Court are based on assumptions that are flatly contradicted by well-respected and
essentially unchallenged empirical studies." 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986). Relying on the due
process clause of the state constitution, the court adopted a somewhat different list of factors:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness's
capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4)
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature
of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive,
remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the
event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was
observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's.
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rejected the Kirby-Ash-Brathwaite due process doctrine63 and applied the
Wade approach to all pretrial identification procedures, those conducted
before as well as after the right to counsel has attached: If the pretrial
procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, testimony about it is excluded per
se, and the eyewitness is permitted to make an in-court identification only
if the prosecution establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
eyewitness will be able to make the identification at trial based solely on
his or her memory of the crime itself, independent of the suggestive
pretrial procedure."
As the rest of this Article demonstrates, this latter approach is much
more consistent with what is now known about human memory and
eyewitness identifications, and therefore is far more consistent with the
ultimate goals of the criminal justice system: to convict those who are
guilty, and avoid convicting those who are innocent.65
C. How Eyewitness Issues Are Litigated
66
Soon after a defendant is arraigned, the defense attorney files a motion
for discovery.67 Included in the motion is a request for information about
Id. at 493. Although similar in some respects to the Biggers-Brathwaite list, this test differs
dramatically in some ways. For example, it eliminates as a factor "the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation" and places much greater emphasis on the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). In Long, the court held that the
trial judge should instruct the jury about these factors in evaluating eyewitness identification. Long,
721 P.2d at 487. In State v. Ramirez, the Court held that if the identification procedure was highly
suggestive, the trial judge should consider these factors in deciding whether to admit such testimony at
all. 817 P.2d 774, 782-83 (Utah 1991). In State v. Hunt, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted Utah's
Ramirez approach. 69 P.3d 571, 576-77 (Kan. 2003). Massachusetts's highest court likewise rejected
the Biggers-Brathwaite factors. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, the court rejected Manson v. Brathwaite
and instructed state courts to continue to apply the following factors: (1) the extent of the witness's
opportunity to observe the defendant at the time of the crime; prior errors, if any, in (2) description, (3)
identifying another person, or in (4) failing to identify the defendant; (5) the receipt of other
suggestions, and (6) the lapse of time between the crime and the identification. 650 N.E.2d 1257,
1261-62 (Mass. 1995). Thus, Massachusetts has also rejected the eyewitness's degree of certainty as a
relevant factor.
63 For discussion of this doctrine, see supra Part Il.A.2.
" Johnson, 650 N.E.2d at 1261; People v. Riley, 517 N.E.2d 520, 525 (N.Y. 1987); State v.
Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 596 (Wis. 2005); see also State v. Herrara, 902 A.2d 177, 182 (N.J. 2006)
(hinting that the court considered the issue a valid one but declining to address it because the defendant
had failed to raise it at trial).
65 Generally, if an eyewitness's memory is contaminated by a suggestive or biased identification
procedure, the error cannot be correct by subsequently conducting a fair lineup. See infra Parts V, IX.
Consequently, there are very limited circumstances where the prosecutor will be able to show that the
eyewitness's in-court identification of the defendant is not tainted by the prior, biased out of court
identification procedure. See infra Part V.
6 This section is based on Professor Fishman's and Professor Wise's experiences as prosecutors,
and on Professor Fishman's discussion of the matter with current prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges, and his reading of more court opinions on the subject than he cares to remember, let alone
count. The procedures described herein will vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the basic
outline is the same.
67 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (setting forth the rules for information subject to disclosure).
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any and all pretrial identifications of the defendant by any eyewitness. In
response, the prosecutor informs defense counsel of the details: which
eyewitnesses identified the defendant, the kind of procedure used, and so
on. 68  At an appropriate time prior to trial, defense counsel moves to
suppress the eyewitness evidence. Where there have been pretrial
identifications, the motion will allege that the identifications were
suggestive, and will lead to a misidentification at trial. The defense
attorney will request that the judge suppress testimony about the pretrial
identifications and also preclude the eyewitnesses from making in-court
identifications.69 Often the judge will order a hearing on the motion.7 °
If the eyewitness testifies at the hearing,7' the prosecutor will ask the
eyewitness questions designed to establish that the eyewitness had a good
opportunity to see the perpetrator (e.g., time, lighting), to note his or her
appearance, and to fix it firmly in the eyewitness's mind.72 The prosecutor
will then ask the eyewitness to describe the identification procedure, again
structuring his or her questions to elicit the strongest impression of non-
suggestiveness that the facts legitimately allow. Ideally, the eyewitness
will testify that as soon as he or she saw the defendant, the eyewitness
recognized the defendant as the perpetrator, based on the eyewitness's
memory of seeing the defendant commit the crime; that the eyewitness was
sure that his or her identification was accurate; and that he or she so
informed the officer.
On cross-examination, defense counsel will seek to undercut each
aspect of the eyewitness's direct testimony. Defense counsel may
challenge the eyewitness's estimation of how long he or she had an
opportunity to view the defendant, and question whether the eyewitness's
powers of perception or memory were diminished by drink, drugs, lack of
sleep, fear, focus on a weapon, or other distractions. The defense attorney
may emphasize any discrepancies between the description the eyewitness
68 In some jurisdictions, prosecutors provide this information voluntarily, without requiring
defense counsel to file a motion.
69 Defense counsel will file a motion to suppress whether the procedure involved was absurdly
and unnecessarily suggestive, or apparently was as completely non-suggestive and as perfect as is
humanly possible. This occurs because, even if the judge ultimately denies the motions to suppress
(which, as every trial lawyer and judge knows, is the result in the vast majority of cases), a hearing on
the motion will require the prosecutor to call at least some of his or her witnesses at the hearing, and
give defense counsel an opportunity to cross-examine them--a type of pretrial discovery that, though
common in civil litigation, is fairly unusual in criminal cases.
70 In some jurisdictions, the defendant is entitled to a hearing as a matter of course. In others, the
judge will grant a hearing only if defense counsel first submits affidavits or other proof that make out a
prima facie case that the pretrial identification was suggestive.
" The prosecutor may decide not to call an eyewitness at the hearing to prevent the defense
attomey from discovering the eyewitness's testimony prior to trial, relying instead on the testimony of
the police officers who conducted the identification procedure. Some jurisdictions, however, may
permit the defense attorney to call the eyewitness to testify at the hearing if the prosecutor does not.
72 To the extent that it will be helpful, the prosecutor's questions will track the reliability factors
discussed by the Supreme Court in Biggers and Brathwaite. See supra text accompanying note 5 1.
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gave to the police and the defendant's actual appearance. Counsel may
probe for evidence of suggestiveness in the lineup, showup, or photo
identification. Counsel may question the eyewitness about any previous
lineups, showups, or photo identifications at which the eyewitness picked
out someone else as the perpetrator.73
If the procedure was a lineup, the prosecutor may introduce a
photograph or video of the lineup to impress upon the judge that it was fair
and non-suggestive. If the eyewitness was shown a number of photographs
in addition to the defendant's, the prosecutor, for the same reason, may
introduce the entire photo array into evidence.
Depending on the circumstances, one or more officers who conducted
the identification procedure may also testify.74  If the identification
procedure was a corporeal one, defense counsel may put the defendant on
the stand at the hearing to contest the prosecutor's version of how the
lineup or showup was conducted. Occasionally, other eyewitnesses may
be available to contradict the prosecutor's eyewitnesses' description of the
identification procedure. After both sides rest and argue the issues, the
judge, applying the appropriate standard (Wade-Gilbert or due process),
will rule on what identification testimony, if any, the eyewitness will be
permitted to give.
D. Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification
For decades, psychologists and defense attorneys have maintained that
eyewitness testimony can be notoriously unreliable, and courts, including
the United States Supreme Court, have recognized this fact.75 The
development of DNA evidence has confirmed what many observers and
participants in the criminal justice system have long suspected, namely,
that the number of innocent people who are convicted of crimes is
distressingly high, and in many such cases, eyewitness identification
testimony played a significant role in their wrongful convictions.
To combat such testimony, defense attorneys have sought to introduce
expert testimony outlining the weaknesses and shortcomings of eyewitness
testimony.76 There is sharp division among courts whether such testimony
meets the requirements governing expert evidence.
As a general rule, expert testimony on any given subject is admissible
"' On the other hand, if it is obvious that the judge will deny the motion to suppress identification
evidence at trial, defense counsel may not use some of this information at the hearing, hoping to
surprise the eyewitness and the prosecutor with it at the trial itself.
'4 If the prosecutor decides not to call the officer as a witness at the hearing, defense counsel may
choose to do so.
7s See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
76 For a detailed discussion of the law governing admissibility of expert testimony concerning
eyewitness identification, see CLIFFORD S. FIsHMAN & ANNE T. McKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§
41:41-41:48 (7th ed., Appendix of New Chapters, 2008).
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only if several criteria are satisfied. 7  First, the subject matter of the
testimony must be one recognized as a valid one for expert testimony,
based on reliable principles and methodology. 78 Second, the expert must
be qualified as an expert on that subject.79 Third, the expert's testimony
must have an adequate factual basis.80 Fourth, the expert must apply "the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 81  Finally, the
testimony must "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue ....
Courts generally accept that a properly qualified expert can satisfy the
first four requirements. 83 But many courts have been reluctant to admit
expert testimony on the weaknesses of eyewitness testimony. Courts cite
two reasons to justify this reluctance. First, many courts have held that
that such testimony "will not aid the jury because it addresses an issue of
which the jury already generally is aware, and it will not contribute to their
understanding of the particular factual issues posed."84 Second, comments
can be found throughout the case law that the "proposed testimony intrudes
too much on the traditional province of the jury to assess witness
credibility., 85  The perceived risk, that the jury will be confused or place
undue emphasis on the expert's testimony, is therefore seen as outweighing
what is viewed as the limited probative value of the evidence.
Courts that accept this reasoning appear to give jurors both too much
credit, and not enough. Such reasoning ignores scientific research showing
that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors and that the effect
of many factors on eyewitness accuracy is not a matter of common sense.86
It also reflects concern that wily experts will induce naive and susceptible
jurors to reject eyewitness testimony that is reliable. Furthermore, it
ignores jurors' tendency to be skeptical of experts, especially defense
experts, whose testimony goes against what they consider simple common
77 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 702 (identifying the elements necessary for expert testimony to be
admitted into evidence).
78 Thus, in the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the subject of the testimony must
consist of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that is] ... the product of reliable
principles and methods .... FED. R. EvID. 702.
See id. ("[The] witness [must be] qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education ... ").
go See id. ("[T]he testimony [must be] based upon sufficient facts or data .
S Id
.
82 Id.
83 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 76, § 41:44.
'4 United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Larkin, 978
F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also State v. Lawhom, 762 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1988) ("[T]he
introduction of expert testimony would be 'a superfluous attempt to put the gloss of expertise, like a bit
of frosting, upon inferences which lay persons were equally capable of drawing from the evidence."
(citation omitted)).
85 United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999).
86 Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Testimony, I PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 909, 921 (1995); Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 824-25.
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sense.
87
A number of courts, however, have held that it is an abuse of discretion
to exclude expert testimony about eyewitness identifications where the
prosecutor's case rests solely or primarily on eyewitness identification,
particularly if it is of uncertain accuracy or sharply contested.88
Furthermore, as Fishman and McKenna state:
Even where a court is receptive to such testimony, it is
generally agreed that the most that should be permitted is
general testimony about the relevant types of difficulties with
eyewitness testimony and that an expert witness should not
be permitted to give an opinion on the accuracy of a
particular eyewitness's testimony, on the ground that such
testimony constitutes impermissible comment on
credibility.
8 9
III. THE CAUSES OF EYEWITNESS ERROR
There are several reasons why an eyewitness's testimony can be
erroneous even though, like Jennifer Thompson, the eyewitness is
87 CHARLES PATRICK EWING, TRIALS OF A FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST: A CASEBOOK 18 (2008)
("[1]n criminal trials jurors often regard prosecution witnesses as objective professionals doing a public
service, while they see defense experts as hired guns who would say anything for the right amount of
money.").
88See Skamarocius v. State, 731 P.2d 63, 66-67 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (noting that
corroboration may come from substantial physical evidence or a codefendant's confession); People v.
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 726 (Cal. 1984) (en banc), overruled in part by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d
265 (Cal. 2000); People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420, 435 (Cal. 1995); Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563, 571
(Ind. 2000); State v. Schutz, 579 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Iowa 1998) (holding that it is within the trial
judge's discretion to admit such testimony); Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1119-20
(Mass. 1997) (noting that when corroborating evidence is available, the exclusion of expert testimony
is not an abuse of discretion); State v. Abraham, 451 S.E.2d 131, 148-49 (N.C. 1994) (holding that
where substantial evidence corroborates eyewitness identification, it is not an abuse of discretion to
deny defense counsel's request that the court appoint an expert witness on eyewitness identification);
People v. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63, 66-67 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the trial judge has discretion to admit
such testimony, and that where significant corroborating evidence exists, it is not an abuse of discretion
to reject the expert's testimony). Even in such cases, however, some courts have opined that problems
with eyewitness identification testimony are unlikely to arise where the eyewitness is a police officer or
someone else trained to observe and professionally accustomed to stressfl situations. See, e.g., United
States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 624 (6th Cir. 2001). In Langan, the eyewitness had served in the Air
Force National Guard where "she received training in identifying individuals attempting to enter
unauthorized areas" and on "the need to remain calm and focused during the attempted takeovers." Id.
The court concluded that, "[iun light of this specialized training, [the defense expert's] generalized
testimony regarding such distracting factors as stress and the presence of a gun would not necessarily
have helped the jury in evaluating [the witness's] identification of Langan." Id. Similarly, in Webster
v. United States, the court held that expert testimony should not be admitted where the eyewitness was
an undercover police officer with considerable training in recognizing and identifying others. 623 A.2d
1198, 1204 n.15 (D.C. 1993). But see infra Part VIII.A.3. (stating that scientific research shows that
police officers are no better at identifying perpetrators of crimes than lay eyewitnesses).
89 FISHsMAN & McKENNA, supra note 76, § 41:46 (citing State v. Nordstrom, 25 P.3d 717, 731
(Ariz. 2001) (en bane)); see also Johnson v. State, 526 S.E.2d 549, 553 n.3 (Ga. 2000); State v. Buell,
489 N.E.2d 795, 804 (Ohio 1986); State v Hubbard, 48 P.3d 953, 960 (Utah 2002).
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testifying in good faith and with a high degree of confidence, and the
police have attempted to conduct a fair and thorough investigation.
A. The Nature of Human Memory
Although human memory can be reasonably accurate, it does not work
like a video camera. 90 Consequently, an eyewitness's memory of a crime
is not stored liked a videotape that the eyewitness can replay to produce an
exact record of the crime. It frequently does not contain the degree of
detail sought by criminal investigators.91 Instead, when an eyewitness
recalls a crime, he or she unconsciously reconstructs his or her memory of
the crime.92 In unconsciously reconstructing his or her memory of the
crime, the eyewitness unknowingly fills in the gaps in his or her factual
memory of the crime based on such factors as the eyewitness's
expectations, attitude, beliefs, and knowledge of similar events.93 These
different sources of information are automatically blended together in the
90 John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 19, 20 (1983); John C. Brigham et al.,
Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 CT. REV. 12, 13
(1999) ("Contrary to popular belief, human perception does not work like a camera or video recorder.
Rather, what is perceived and stored in memory is often incomplete or distorted as a result of the
individual's state of mind or nature of the event observed.").
91 Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psychology and Cognitive
Neuroscience, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 182, 197 (1999); see also Richard A. Wise et al., A Survey of
Defense Attoneys'Knowledge and Beliefs About Eyewitness Testimony, CHAMPION, Nov. 2007, at 23
("Although memory can be reasonably accurate, it frequently does not contain the degree of detail
sought by criminal investigators and is fragile and subject to changes in subtle ways by new
information.").
92 See CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THEORY, RESEARCH AND
APPLICATIONS 228 (3d ed. 2004). Bartol and Bartol state that:
Memory, especially for complex or unusual events, involves the integration of
perceptual information with preexisting experiences, as well as with other subjective
relevant information that may be introduced later. In this sense, memory is very
much a reconstructive, integrative process that develops with the flow of new
experiences and thoughts. This perspective is called the reconstructive theory of
memory.
Id.
93 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 180. For example, researchers conducted a study that determined
that people have shared "scripts" for common types of crimes, such as a convenience store robbery,
bank robbery, or mugging. "Scripts are widely held beliefs about sequences of actions that typically
occur in particular situations." Id. They found that people's scripts for a convenience store robbery
consist of the following elements: The robber cases the store, plans the robbery, enters the store,
observes who is in the store, acts like a customer, waits for an opportunity, approaches the cash
register, pulls out a gun, demands money, takes the money, exits the store, and drives away. Id. In a
follow-up study, researchers had participants listen to a mock criminal trial that involved a convenience
store robbery where evidence was omitted for three key elements: the casing of the store, using a gun,
and taking the money. Id. Most participants in the study, nonetheless, erroneously recalled hearing
evidence during the trial that indicated that the three missing elements occurred during the alleged
crime. Id. This study demonstrates that an eyewitness's expectations, attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge
will influence what an eyewitness perceives, encodes, stores, and retrieves about a crime. Id. at 181;
see also Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 15 (stating that when witnesses recall crimes, they fill in the
blanks with information based on expectancies and information obtained after the crime).
2009]
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
eyewitness's memory to produce an account of the crime that is apparently
seamless and coherent but that may contain inaccuracies.94
B. Eyewitness Bias
An eyewitness's expectations, attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge not
only influence what an eyewitness recalls about a crime, but also what the
eyewitness perceives about a crime. 95 For example, if a hair stylist
witnesses a crime, he or she may pay more attention to the perpetrator's
hair than other eyewitnesses would. In addition, these factors influence
what an eyewitness encodes about a crime.96 Encoding refers to the
process by which an eyewitness transforms what he or she perceives about
a crime into a stored memory.97 Normally, the eyewitness is unaware of
the process of encoding.9
Because encoding involves interpretation and inference, what is stored
in memory is not just what the eyewitness saw during the crime, but also
the meaning the eyewitness gave to what occurred.99 Furthermore, the
meaning that an eyewitness gives to the crime is influenced by his or her
expectations, attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge.'1° Factors present during a
crime such as a high level of stress, a weapon, or a disguise may further
hamper an eyewitness's ability to accurately encode important details of
the crime.'10  Forgetting the details of the crime can occur rapidly. 0 2 New
faces, pictures, and events experienced after the crime can also interfere
with the eyewitness's memory of the crime.'0 3
94 See BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 92, at 228 ("[E]ven the most well-intentioned eyewitnesses
may err and unconsciously distort their recall and identification. In part, this explains the radically
different accounts of the same event that are provided by witnesses who are 'absolutely positive' about
what they saw.").
951d; Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 8, 15. There are four stages to memory: perception,
encoding, storage, and retrieval. EDIE GREENE ET AL., WRIGHTSMAN'S PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 129-32 (6th ed. 2007).
96 See Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 8 ("Expectancies can exert a powerful influence on
attention and recall of relevant information.").
97 WEITEN, supra note 14, at 205-06.
98 BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 92, at 228.
99Id.
100 Id.
101 See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on
Eyewitness Memory, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 694 (2004); K. E. Patterson & A. D. Baddeley, When
Face Recognition Fails, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HuM. LEARNING & MEMORY 406, 410 (1977);
Peter N. Shapiro & Steven D. Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 139, 139-51 (1986); Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus
Effect, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 414,420-21 (1992).
102 See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, A Maturing of Research on the Behaviour of Eyewitnesses, 5
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 377, 381 (1991) ("With single-trace fragility theory, trace decay is by
far the greater contributor to forgetting in the first minutes and hours after initial encounter of a face,
but the amount of forgetting due to this source decreases per unit of time.").
103 WEn'EN, supra note 14, at 218.
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C. Misinformation Effect
Because an eyewitness's memory of a crime is a reconstructive
process, it can be altered by information that the eyewitness learns after the
crime from other sources such as other eyewitnesses, the police, the
prosecutor, and the media. 1 4 The eyewitness generally does not know that
his or her memory of the crime has been changed and updated by post-
event information, which may or may not be accurate. 10 5 Moreover, the
post-event information not only affects an eyewitness's memory of the
crime, but it may also impair his or her ability to identify the perpetrator of
the crime.
10 6
D. Source Monitoring Errors
Eyewitnesses can become confused about where they learned
information about a crime or where they saw an individual. Accordingly,
eyewitnesses may misattribute information to observing a crime when in
fact they learned it from another source such as the media, a police officer,
a prosecutor, or another eyewitness. 10 7 They also sometimes identify as the
perpetrator of a crime an individual who was a bystander to the crime or
whom they saw in another situation or context.108  For example, a rape
victim identified a psychologist, Dr. Donald Thompson, as her rapist.1°9 At
the time of the rape, however, Dr. Thompson was in a television studio
giving a live interview, ironically, about the fallibility of eyewitness
memory."0  The rape victim had seen part of the interview of Dr.
104 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 844-45; see also BARTOL & BARTOL, supra
note 92, at 229 (stating that police officers do not recognize that a person's memory can be
contaminated by "careless interviewing and misleading commentary"); Ronald P. Fisher, Interviewing
Victims and Witnesses of Crime, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 732, 740 (1995) ("There is little
argument, however, that the phenomenon of postevent suggestibility exists, that it is robust, and
perhaps most important, that witnesses truly believe that they observed an event that was only
suggested.").
105 See BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 92, at 228 ("Moreover, there are ample opportunities for
witnesses to encounter additional information after the event and then integrate it unknowingly into
their original memories.").
'06 See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May Be
Contagious, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 323, 333 (1980) ("The verbal expressions and other postevent
information to which a witness is exposed will not only appear in the verbal reports of witnesses but
will also influence future recognition of persons who have been seen before.").
107 See Schacter, supra note 91, at 188 ("First, people may remember correctly an item or fact
from a past experience but misattribute the fact to an incorrect source. For instance, individuals
sometimes recall encountering a bit of trivia in the newspaper that, in fact, they acquired from the
experimenter.").
1w See, e.g., COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 178-79 ("Robert Buckhout, one of the first
psychologists to conduct systematic research on eyewitnesses, staged a series of thefts and assaults in
his classroom. Of the students who witnessed the mock crime, 39% showed the unconscious
transference effect. These witnesses incorrectly identified a person who had been in the classroom the
day of the crime.")
'
09 Id at 179.
110 Id.
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Thompson and in her memory unconsciously transferred his face from the
interview to the rape."'
E. Hindsight Bias
When an individual knows how an event turned out, this knowledge
affects both the individual's memory of the event and his or her memory of
what they were thinking when the event occurred. 1 2 Therefore, once an
eyewitness learns that a suspect has been indicted and is going to be tried
for a crime, this information alters an eyewitness's memory of the crime
and what the eyewitness remembers about what he or she was thinking
when the crime occurred. 1
3
F. Eyewitness Overconfidence in the Accuracy of His or Her Perceptions
and Memory and the Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence
People tend to overestimate the accuracy of their perceptions and
memory.14 Thus, eyewitnesses are likely to be overconfident about the
accuracy of their account of the crime and their identification of the
suspect as the perpetrator of the crime.115 In addition, not only is an
eyewitness's memory of a crime highly malleable, but so is an
eyewitness's confidence in the accuracy of his or her memory of the
crime. 1 6 Many factors can increase eyewitness confidence, but do not in
any way improve the accuracy of an eyewitness's identification. 17  For
instance, questioning of an eyewitness by the police and prosecutor,
confirmation feedback from a lineup administrator (e.g., "Good! You have
identified the suspect."), and learning that another eyewitness has also
identified the suspect all increase an eyewitness's confidence but not his or
11' Id.
112 WEITEN, supra note 14, at 230-31.
113 id.
114 Id. at 231.
l1
5
1d
"
6 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 624 ("Confidence
malleability refers to the tendency for an eyewitness to become more (or less) confident in his or her
identification as a function of events that occur after the identification.").
"
7 See Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, Eyewitness Confidence and the Confidence-
Accuracy Relationship in Memory for People, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY,
MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 377, 417-18 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007). Leippe and Eisenstadt write:
The ready malleability of confidence by feedback, co-witness information,
deliberate or inadvertent communication by police investigators, repeated
questioning, lawyer briefings, and other events make it clear that confidence
statements made following an immediate post-identification confidence judgment
will inevitably be hopelessly undiagnostic of memory accuracy. Short of being
restricted to a hermetically sealed room until the trial, it is hard to imagine an
eyewitness not being subjected to manipulative influences on his or her confidence.
Id; see also Saul M. Kassin et al., On the "General Acceptance" of Eyewitness Testimony Research, A
New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405,410 (2001); Wells et al., From the Lab, supra
note 15, at 586.
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her accuracy.118  Post-event information has its greatest effect on the
eyewitness's confidence in erroneous information." 9
The eyewitness is generally unaware that his or her confidence has
been increased by these factors. 20  Furthermore, when the eyewitness is
asked at trial how confident he or she was in the accuracy of the
identification at the time of the lineup, the eyewitness tends to report his or
her present level of confidence. Eyewitnesses tend to make this error
because they cannot recall at trial how confident they were in the accuracy
of their identification at the time they made it.'2 ' Artificially increasing
eyewitness confidence can cause wrongful convictions because studies
show eyewitness confidence is generally the most important factor that the
trier of fact relies on when evaluating the accuracy of eyewitness
118 See John S. Shaw III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can Lead to
Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 629, 630 (1996). Shaw and McClure
state:
For example, Wells, Ferguson, and Lindsay found that briefing witnesses about the
nature of an impending cross-examination can lead to higher confidence ratings
during the subsequent examination, and Luus and Wells demonstrated that providing
information to an eyewitness about a co-witness's identification decision (e.g.,
whom the witness picked from a lineup) can alter that eyewitness's confidence about
her or his own choice.
Recent research by Shaw suggests that a common police investigation
procedure-repeated questioning of witnesses-may also result in changes in
witness confidence independently of eyewitness accuracy.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the
Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 374 (1998). "[A] casual comment from a lineup administrator following
eyewitnesses' identification can have dramatic effects on their reconstructions of the witnessing and
identification experience." Id. For example, such a comment caused the witness to state that the
defendant's face "just 'popped out' to them, that their memorial image of the gunman is particularly
clear, and that they are adept at recognizing faces of strangers. These effects were very robust, with
effect sizes that exceed what are normally considered large effects in psychology." Id
119 See Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice s Eyewitness Evidence: A
Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 249 (2000) ("Research has found that the
confidence-inflating impact of post-event questioning was the largest for inaccurate responses,
including responses to questions about the witnesses' memory for an object that did not even exist in
the original event ... ").
120 Wells & Bradfield, supra note 118, at 373.
121 Id. at 362. Wells states that:
That is, eyewitnesses do not form clear impressions at the time of the event about
how good or poor their view is, how much attention they are paying, how confident
they are in their identification, and so on. Instead, people's memories for cognitive
processes operating during an event (in this case the witnessed event as well as the
event of making an identification) are, like other memories, reconstructions. Hence,
answers to these questions are postcomputed (later) by eyewitnesses when the
relevant question is asked of them. When later asked to judge how good their view
was, for example, the eyewitness does not recall an impression or judgment but
ratherfonns one.
Id.; see also Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 635-36 ("The only
way to know how confident the eyewitness was at the time of the identification is to have asked the
eyewitness at the time of the identification.").
20091
testimony. 122
G. Eyewitnesses Tend to Make a Relative Judgment in Making an
Identification
Eyewitnesses are likely to make a relative judgment when they select a
lineup participant, 123  particularly when law enforcement uses a
simultaneous lineup (where all lineup participants are presented at once)
rather than a sequential lineup (where lineup participants are presented
individually). 124  In other words, eyewitnesses generally select the lineup
participant who most closely resembles their memory of the perpetrator of
the crime. 125 A sequential lineup is more likely to prompt the eyewitness
to compare each participant in the lineup to the eyewitness's memory of
the perpetrator of the crime (i.e., make an absolute judgment), rather than
compare the participants to each other (i.e., make a relative judgment). 26
Relative judgments frequently result in erroneous eyewitness
identification, especially in lineups that do not include the perpetrator of
the crime. 12 7  Eyewitnesses tend to make relative judgments for several
122 Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 620 (stating that
eyewitness confidence "is the most powerful single determinant of whether or not observers of that
testimony will believe that the eyewitness made an accurate identification").
123 Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 585-86.
124 See id. ("The standard police lineup presents the eyewitness with all lineup members (e.g., six
or eight persons) at one time. Under these conditions, eyewitnesses tend to compare lineup members
with each other to determine which one most closely resembles the perpetrator relative to the others, a
process called relative judgment."). In contrast, sequential lineups decreased the probability that the
eyewitness will make a relative judgment:
In sequential lineups, the witness views the lineup members one at a time and is
asked to make an identification decision after viewing each one. The witness is
instructed that each lineup member will be presented only once and is not told how
many lineup members will be presented. The lineup stops when the witness
identifies someone or has seen all the lineup members without identifying anyone.
Reliably fewer false identifications are obtained with sequential than with
simultaneous presentation.
Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective Is the Motion-to-Suppress Safeguard? Judges' Perceptions of
the Suggestiveness and Fairness of Biased Lineup Procedures, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 211, 212
(1997); see also discussion infra Part VII.6. (discussing sequential lineups).
125 Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 613 ("There is good
empirical evidence to indicate that eyewitnesses tend to identify the person from the lineup who, in the
opinion of the eyewitness, looks most like the culprit relative to the other members of the lineup.").
126 In one study, Lindsay and Wells found that:
Although the eyewitness [viewing a sequential lineup] could decide that the person
being viewed currently looks more like the perpetrator than did the previous person,
the eyewitness cannot be sure that the next (not yet viewed) person does not look
even more like the perpetrator than did the one being viewed currently. Lindsay and
Wells reasoned that this would force eyewitnesses to use a more absolute criterion
(i.e., "Is this the perpetrator or notT') rather than the relative-judgment criterion (i.e.,
"Is the person more similar to the perpetrator than the other lineup membersT').
Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 586.
127 See Rudolf Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of Corroborative Evidence in
Due Process Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1097, 1104-05
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reasons. First, they logically assume that law enforcement would not
conduct a lineup if they did not have a suspect.12  Second, many
eyewitnesses feel pressure from law enforcement, relatives, friends, and
themselves to make an identification.' 29  In addition, many eyewitnesses
feel like a failure if they cannot make an identification during an
identification procedure.130
H. Lineups Are Frequently Conducted in a Manner that Draws the
Eyewitness's Attention to the Suspect (e.g., The Lineup-as-Experiment
Analogy)
Scientists have long known that safeguards are necessary to ensure that
they do not unintentionally influence participants in an experiment.1
3
'
Unintentional influence is often a problem because people unconsciously
tend to test their hypotheses in a manner that confirms them and because of
the self-fulfilling nature of expectations. 32  Thus, scientists implement
safeguards to ensure that the results of their experiments are the product of
the independent variable (i.e., the variable the experimenter manipulates to
try to produce an effect) and not the experimenter's bias or some other
extraneous factor.1 33 By analogy, in lineups, the "independent variable" is
the eyewitness's memory and the desired result is that the eyewitness
either does or does not identify the suspect as the perpetrator of the crime
based solely on his or her memory of the perpetrator of the crime.
Professors Garrioch and Brimacombe explain how a lineup
administrator's bias that the suspect is the perpetrator can affect the
fairness of a lineup:
Like a researcher with a specific hypothesis (i.e., that a
particular lineup [participant] is the suspect), the detective is
(2003) (stating that erroneous eyewitness identifications decreased forty-three percent when
eyewitnesses were warned prior to the lineup that the perpetrator might not be in the lineup).
121 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 630.
129 Brigham et al., supra note 90, at 15.
130 Gunter Koehnken et al., Forensic Application of Line-Up Research, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 205, 208-09 (Sigfried Ludwig Sporer et al. eds., 1996).
131 See Judges, supra note 119, at 249-50.
132 Bradfield et al., supra note 12, at 118 (stating that in scientific research, "[t]he only acceptable
safeguard became the 'double-blind' experiment, in which neither the experimenter nor the participant
knew what the hypothesis was" and that this safeguard is necessary to prevent the experimenter from
unintentionally influencing the participant to respond in a manner that was consistent with the
experimental hypothesis).
133 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 627 ("The
confirmation bias in human reasoning and behavior is the seed that gives birth to the self-fulfilling
prophecy phenomenon in which a person's assumption that a phenomenon will happen leads to
behaviors that tend to make the phenomenon happen."); WEITEN, supra note 14, at 38 ("An
independent variable is a condition or event that an experimenter varies in order to see its impact on
another variable."); see also id. at 38-40, 48-50 (noting safeguards that scientists use to ensure that the
results of experiments are not influenced by the experimenter's bias).
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now in a position to exert tremendous influence in
administering the lineup. A lineup administrator's
knowledge of the suspect's identity can increase the
likelihood that the witness will identify the suspect.1
3 4
Professor Wells and his colleagues further elaborate on how lineups
resemble experiments:
[T]he police have a hypothesis (that the suspect is the
culprit); they collect materials that could be used to test the
hypothesis (e.g., picture of the suspect and filler pictures),
they create a design (e.g., placing suspect's picture in a
particular position in an array), instruct the subject(s)
(eyewitness or eyewitnesses); run the procedure (show the
lineup to the eyewitness), record the data (identification of
the suspect or not); and interpret the hypothesis in light of the
data (decide whether the identification decision changes their
assessment of whether the suspect is the culprit). 135
The lineup-as-experiment analogy helps us to identify procedural
errors in lineups that are likely to cause eyewitness misidentifications.
They include:
[T]he presence of demand characteristics (e.g., pressuring the
eyewitness to make a choice), the influence of confirmation
biases (e.g., asking the eyewitness specifically about the
suspect while not asking those same questions about the
distractors), the facilitation of response biases (e.g.,
encouraging a loose recognition criterion threshold in the
eyewitness), making inferences from small sample sizes (e.g.,
making strong judgments of validity based on only one
eyewitness), not using control groups (e.g., failing to see if
even people who did not witness the crime [but who have the
eyewitness's description of the perpetrator] can identify the
suspect),11363 selective recording and interpretation of data
(e.g., finding significance in an identification of the suspect,
but ignoring the outcome if the eyewitness makes a non-
identification), leaking of the hypothesis (e.g., making it
"4 Lynn Garrioch & C.A. Elizabeth Brimacombe, Lineup Administrators' Expectations: Their
Impact on Eyewitness Confidence, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 299, 300 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
"' Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 618.
136 Id. Among other concerns, Wells and his colleagues mention the use of "mock witnesses" as a
solution to the problem of biased lineups: "Mock witnesses are people who have never seen the culprit
but are given the eyewitness's verbal description of the culprit, shown a picture of the lineup or
photospread, and asked to select the person they think is the suspect in the case." Id at 631. If after
reading the eyewitness's description of the perpetrator the mock witnesses select the suspect from the
photo array at greater levels than chance, the lineup is likely biased.
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obvious to the eyewitness which person in the lineup is the
suspect), and a host of other possible confounds. 137
Accordingly, to avoid eyewitness error, law enforcement must conduct
lineups so that an eyewitness identification of a suspect is a product of the
eyewitness's memory and not how the lineup was conducted.
138
It is also useful to view eyewitness evidence as a type of trace evidence
such as fingerprints, DNA, and firearm patterns. 39  Similar to other types
of trace evidence, eyewitness evidence has a physiological basis (i.e.,
biochemical changes in the eyewitness's brain).' Therefore, its accuracy
depends in part on the use of proper scientific procedures to extract the
evidence.'14  In sum, before ruling on the admission of eyewitness
evidence at trial, a judge should evaluate whether proper scientific
procedures were used in collecting it, and if they were not used, that fact
should weigh heavily against admitting the testimony. 42 Unfortunately, as
is discussed below, most lineups do not comply with scientific guidelines
for conducting fair and unbiased lineups nor does law enforcement
generally follow scientific guidelines when engaged in other procedures
for collecting eyewitness evidence, such as eyewitness interviews.
143
I. Lack of Knowledge of Memory and Eyewitness Factors
Police officers, attorneys, judges, and jurors lack knowledge about
how memory works and how eyewitness factors affect identification
137 Id. at 618.
" See id at 618-19 (noting the importance of proper extraction of an eyewitness's memory).
139See id. at 618 ("Some forms of forensic evidence, such as fingerprints, DNA, and firearms
patterns are subject to criticism for not following scientific principles in the collection and analysis of
the evidence. We see no reason why eyewitness identification evidence should not be treated in a
similar fashion.").
140 For example:
Eyewitness evidence can be construed as a type of trace evidence except that, unlike
blood or fingerprints, the trace is in the brain of a human observer in the form of a
memory. This memory trace even has some physical properties in the sense of
being located as a neurological trace in the brain. Like physical evidence, the
critical issue is how to extract the evidence in a way that is maximally diagnostic of
identity.
Id. at 618-19.
141 Id.
142 See id. at 617-19 (analogizing good methods for conducting an experiment with good methods
for conducting lineups); see also Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 58, at 21 ("Today, police carry out
very complex evidence collection procedures with physical evidence such as blood, hair, and fiber that
have to conform to precise protocols and careful documentation. Clearly, police would be capable of
carrying out careful non-suggestive protocols with eyewitness identification evidence as well if courts
were more assertive in demanding it.").
143 Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 604; Ronald P. Fisher &
Nadja Schreiber, Interview Protocols to Improve Eyewitness Memory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR EVENTs 53,55 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007).
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accuracy.' 44 Their lack of knowledge about the nature of memory and
eyewitness factors makes it difficult for them to prevent eyewitness error
and to determine when it has occurred.
145
IV. WHY JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS NEED A METHOD FOR ASSESSING
EYEWITNESS ACCURACY IN CRIMINAL CASES
It is vital that judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys know how to
correctly evaluate the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Such knowledge
is essential so that they can properly assess the probative value of
eyewitness testimony in criminal cases and help prevent wrongful
convictions that might result from erroneous eyewitness testimony. For
example, trial judges need this skill when determining if they should admit
testimony about a pretrial eyewitness identification, allow an in-court
identification by the eyewitness, admit eyewitness expert testimony,
permit other legal safeguards to educate jurors about eyewitness testimony,
in ruling on eyewitness evidentiary issues, and in bench trials when they
must evaluate the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. 46 Appellate judges
must know how to evaluate the accuracy of eyewitness testimony when
they decide if the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert
testimony about potential weaknesses of eyewitness testimony. Such
knowledge will also help appellate judges determine whether the
eyewitness testimony in a case is sufficiently reliable to affirm a guilty
verdict on appeal.
Prosecutors have to assess if the eyewitness testimony in a case is
sufficiently accurate to indict a suspect and take a case to trial.
147
Prosecutors also need this skill when preparing the state's eyewitnesses for
cross-examination, arguing eyewitness evidentiary issues, and attempting
to persuade the trier-of-fact that the state's eyewitness testimony is
reliable. 14
8
Knowing how to evaluate the accuracy of eyewitness testimony is also
1 Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Has Eyewitness Testimony Research Penetrated the American
Legal System? A Synthesis of Case History, Juror Knowledge, and Expert Testimony, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF EYEwTrNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 453, 475-76, 484-87 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al.
eds., 2007).
145 See Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 843-48 (discussing common errors that
law officers make during eyewitness identification procedures). Wise et al., as part of their tripartite
solution to eyewitness error, advocate educating the principal participants in the criminal justice system
about eyewitness testimony to sensitize them to the effects of error. Id. at 822. They also describe the
many benefits that would accrue to the criminal justice system if the principal participants in the
criminal justice system were knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony. Id. at 866-67.
4 GREENE ET AL., supra note 95, at 144.
'
47 Cf Richard A. Wise et al., What US Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Know and Believe
About Eyewitness Testimony, 23 APPLIED COGNrrVE PSYCHOL. 1266 (2009) (describing a study
involving prosecutors and defense attorneys and finding that prosecutors often overestimate the
reliability of eyewitness testimony and jurors' knowledge of eyewitness testimony).
14 id.
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critical to defense attorneys. This knowledge will enable them to more
effectively cross-examine an eyewitness at a pretrial identification hearing
and at trial, advise a defendant whether to accept a plea bargain, decide
whether to offer an eyewitness expert at trial, and argue to the trier of fact
that the state's eyewitness testimony in a case is unreliable or wrong. 149
Although the ability to evaluate the accuracy of eyewitness testimony
is essential to legal professionals, scientific studies show that
prosecutors,' 50 defense attorneys, 151 and even judges have limited
knowledge of eyewitness factors.152  For example, Wise and Safer
surveyed 160 judges about a wide range of eyewitness factors and
procedures that affect identification accuracy. 5 3 Some of the questions in
the survey were the same or similar to those used in an earlier survey of
eyewitness experts. 5 4  For those questions, the judges' answers were
compared to experts' answers. 155 The judges also indicated for a subset of
questions how they believed the average juror would respond to the
question and what legal safeguards they would permit attorneys to use to
educate jurors about eyewitness factors. 56  These latter questions are
important because research has consistently shown that jurors are unaware
of many of the factors that affect identification accuracy and cannot
distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. 57  Yet one of
149 See supra Part II.C. (discussing how eyewitness issues are litigated).
s0 John C. Brigham & Melissa P. WolfsKeil, Opinions of Attorneys and Law Enforcement
Personnel on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 346 (1983) ("In
general, prosecuting attorneys and law enforcement officers were similar in their responses to most of
the survey questions. These individuals consistently indicated that they regard eyewitness
identification as relatively accurate and feel that its importance is appropriately emphasized by judges
and jurors."); Wise et al., A Survey, supra note 91, at 20.
... See Brigham & WolfsKeil, supra note 150, at 342-47; George L. Rahaim & Stanley L.
Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus Common Sense: Juror and Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness
Accuracy, 7 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 1, 8-11 (1982); Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective Is the
Presence-of-Counsel Safeguard? Attorney Perceptions of Suggestiveness, Fairness, and Correctability
of Biased Lineup Procedures, 81 J. APPLIED PSCHOL. 64, 72 (1996); Wise et al., A Survey, supra note
91, at 22; A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification a Matter
of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITNESs EVIDENCE 37-39 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R.
Clifford eds., 1983).152 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 13.
153 Id. at 7.
154 Id. at 8.
"
551d. at 9-11.
156 Id. at 8.
'.. See John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 19, 29 (1983) (finding that jurors would
benefit from eyewitness expert testimony on eyewitness factors); Thomas Dillickrath, Expert
Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Admissibility and Alternatives, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1059,
1062-63 (2001) (advocating for expert testimony given jurors' general lack of knowledge of
eyewitness testimony); Saul M. Kassin & Kimberly A. Barndollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness
Testimony: A Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1241, 1243-45
(1992) (showing that student mock jurors' answers in a study were significantly different from those of
eyewitness experts); R. C. L. Lindsay et al., Mock Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Witnesses,
13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 337-38 (1989) (discussing a study in which mock jurors were unable to
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the most common reasons judges exclude eyewitness expert testimony at
trial is their beliefs that jurors are knowledgeable about eyewitness
factors. 58
The study showed that the judges had limited knowledge of eyewitness
testimony as they averaged only fifty-five percent correct on the fourteen-
item knowledge scale. 5 9 Thus, many judges in the survey were unaware
that eyewitness confidence is not related to eyewitness accuracy at trial,
that sequential lineups are more effective than simultaneous lineups in
reducing erroneous eyewitness identifications, and that several studies
indicate jurors cannot differentiate between accurate and inaccurate
eyewitness testimony. 160  The judges' answers compared to those of the
eyewitness experts differed significantly on five of the eight questions
where they answered the same or similar questions. 161  In addition, the
judges were substantially less skeptical than the experts of jurors'
distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses). Scientific studies have delineated the
deficiencies in jurors' knowledge of eyewitness testimony:
Using a variety of methods to test jurors' knowledge of eyewitnesses, researchers
have found that: (1) jurors have limited knowledge of the factors that influence
eyewitness accuracy, such as the effects of the perpetrator wearing a hat or using a
weapon on identification accuracy; (2) jurors rely on factors which are not good
indicators of eyewitness accuracy, such as eyewitness confidence, memory for
minor or trivial details, and inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony; (3) jurors
overestimate the ability of eyewitnesses to make accurate identifications; and (4)
jurors in mock trials cannot distinguish accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses.
Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 824-25.
158 For a discussion of the reasons courts generally give for excluding eyewitness expert
testimony, see FISHmAN & McKENNA, supra note 76, §§ 40:22-40:25. Leippe, supra note 86, at 911-
12; and Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on
Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 46 A.L.R. 4TH 1047, 1054-58 (1986). Judges are hostile to
eyewitness expert testimony for several reasons:
First, they are not knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony, and therefore do not
realize that the effect of many eyewitness factors on identification accuracy is not a
matter of common sense. They also appear to be concerned about the time and
expense that would result from permitting expert testimony. Finally, they seem to
believe that jurors will perfunctorily follow the opinion of the expert resulting in
guilty defendants going free.
Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 823 n.121; see also United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d
311, 315 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992)) ("[B]ecause
it addresses an issue of which the jury already generally is aware... it will not contribute to their
understanding of the particular factual issue posed.").
159 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 13. In a follow-up study, undergraduates and law students
completed the same eyewitness questionnaire that was administered to the judges. Richard A. Wise &
Martin A. Safer, A Comparison of What US. Judges and Students Know and Believe About Eyewitness
Testimony, J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming) (on file with authors). The results of the study
showed that judges were no more knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony than the undergraduates
and slightly less knowledgeable than the law students. Id. These results occurred even though the
judges on average had practiced law for fourteen years, been on the bench for twelve years, and
seventy-six percent of judges had been a prosecutor, defense attorney, or both prior to becoming a
judge. Id.
160 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 9-11, 13; see also discussion infra Part VII.6. (noting the
importance of using sequential lineups).
161 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 9-11.
[Vol. 42:435
ACCURACY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
knowledge of eyewitness testimony. 162  The judges in the survey were
reluctant to permit expert testimony to educate jurors about eyewitness
testimony even though expert testimony is the only legal safeguard that has
demonstrated any effectiveness in educating jurors about eyewitness
testimony. 163 Other studies of judges' knowledge of eyewitness testimony
have yielded similar results.' 64
Attorneys' and judges' lack of knowledge of eyewitness testimony is
not surprising. The effect of many of these eyewitness factors on
eyewitness accuracy is not a matter of common sense, and in fact may be
quite counter-intuitive, and attorneys and judges receive little training
about eyewitness testimony. 16  Moreover, even experienced judges and
attorneys are unaware of these factors, probably because they do not
receive feedback on which eyewitnesses gave inaccurate testimony during
trials and what eyewitness factors caused their inaccuracies. 166
Furthermore, even if judges and attorneys were knowledgeable about
eyewitness factors, it would still be difficult for them to assess the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. This result would likely occur because
the ability to assess accuracy of eyewitness testimony is not just a matter of
knowledge but also of integration.' 67  Integration is the ability to apply
relevant knowledge when making a decision. 168  As Cutler and Penrod
162 See id. at 11.163 id.
16 See Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing
Jurors, Judges, and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITVE PSYCHOL. 115,
126 (2006) (finding that jurors, judges, and law enforcement officers had limited knowledge of
eyewitness testimony); Par Anders Granhag et al., Eyewitness Testimony: Tracing the Beliefs of
Swedish Professionals, 23 BEHAv. Sc. & L. 709, 723 (2005); Svein Magnussen et al., What Judges
Know About Eyewitness Testimony: A Comparison of Norwegian and US Judges, 14 PSYCHOL. CRIME
& L. 177, 185 (2008) ("The results of the present study, in conjunction with the Wise and Safer study,
show that judges in Norway and the US have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors, and they
harbour beliefs and opinions that are at odds with current scientific knowledge as defined by the
opinions of eyewitness experts." (citations omitted)).
165 See Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 13 (finding that seventy-five percent of judges thought
they should receive more training on eyewitness testimony).166id
167 Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 311,313 (1989).
168 Cutler also states:
Sensitivity comprises two components: knowledge and integration. Knowledge
refers to awareness how units of information should be combined to form a
judgment; for example, knowledge of what witnessing and identification factors are
important and how these factors should be combined in the evaluation of eyewitness
identification accuracy. Integration refers to the ability to form judgments that
reflect the unit combinatorial scheme about which the judge is knowledgeable; for
example, ability to integrate eyewitness evidence in accordance with the judge's
knowledge of what witnessing and identification factors are important.
Theoretically, knowledge and integration skills can vary independently.
Id. The method for analyzing eyewitness testimony described in this Article not only informs attorneys
and judges about many different types of factors that affect eyewitness accuracy, but it also helps them
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note, decision making research in a variety of psychological domains
shows that integration is quite difficult to achieve, even by trained
experts.'69 Accordingly, what judges and attorneys need to assess the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony is not merely greater knowledge about
eyewitness testimony, but also a method of analyzing eyewitness testimony
that enables them to apply the relevant eyewitness factors to the facts of a
case. That is what this Article offers.
TABLE 1:
METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE ACCURACY OF EYEwITNEss TESTIMONY
Step 1: Evaluating the Eyewitness Interviews
A. Did the interviews obtain the maximum amount of information from the
eyewitness?
B. Did the interviews contaminate the eyewitness's memory?
1. Did they contaminate the eyewitness's memory of the crime?
2. Did they contaminate the eyewitness's memory of the perpetrator of the
crime?
C. Did the interviews, identification procedures, other eyewitnesses, the
prosecutor, the media, or some other factor significantly increase the
confidence of the eyewitness prior to taking a statement of the eyewitness's
confidence in the accuracy of his or her identification?
Step 2: Evaluating the Identification Procedures and Identification Accuracy
A. Did one of the following circumstances occur that would make the
eyewitness's identification of the defendant presumptively inaccurate?
1. Was the eyewitness interview significantly biased and did the bias
pertain to information concerning the description or identity of the
perpetrator?
2. Was an identification procedure significantly biased?
overcome the problem of integrating that knowledge into their analyses of eyewitness accuracy. See
discussion infra Part V (describing the method for analyzing eyewitness testimony).
169 Steven D. Penrod & Brian Cutler, Preventing Mistaken Convictions in Eyewitness
Identification Trials, The Case Against Traditional Safeguards, in 10 PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW, THE
STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 89, 114 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999).
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B. Because of the nature of memory, the effects of biased interviews and
identification procedures on identification accuracy cannot be corrected by
later conducting a fair interview and identification procedure. Accordingly,
if an eyewitness's memory of the perpetrator of a crime has been
significantly contaminated, identification by the eyewitness of the defendant
should be considered presumptively inaccurate.
C. Does one of the two exceptions apply to the general rule that an
eyewitness's identification is presumptively inaccurate if an eyewitness
interview or identification procedure was significantly biased?
1. Did some unusual circumstance exist that overcomes the presumptive
inaccuracy of the identification (e.g., the eyewitness knew the
perpetrator prior to the crime or had prolonged repeated exposure to the
perpetrator)?
2. Was there reliable, valid corroborating evidence that establishes the
veracity of the eyewitness testimony?
D. Were the eyewitness interviews and identification procedures fair and
impartial or did one of the exceptions to biased interviews and identification
procedures apply? If so, go on to Step 3. If not, the eyewitness's
identification should be presumed to be inaccurate.
Step 3: Evaluating the Eyewitness Factors Present During the Crime
A. What eyewitness factors during the crime likely increased the accuracy of
the eyewitness identification and testimony?
B. What eyewitness factors during the crime likely decreased the accuracy of
the eyewitness identification and testimony?
Step 4: Conclusions
A. Was the maximum amount of information obtained from the eyewitness
during the interviews?
B. Was a statement of the eyewitness's confidence in the accuracy of his or her
identification obtained prior to the eyewitness receiving any feedback?
C. Is there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewitness's testimony
was accurate?
D. Is there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewitness
identification was accurate?
2009]
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V. A METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE ACCURACY
OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
Professor Wise has developed a method of analyzing eyewitness
testimony that enables judges and attorneys to apply the relevant
eyewitness factors to the facts of the case so they can better evaluate the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. This method of analyzing eyewitness
testimony consists of three components.
First, judges and attorneys determine if law enforcement officials (a)
conducted the eyewitness interviews in a manner that obtained the
maximum amount of information from the eyewitness; (b) did not
contaminate the eyewitness's memory of the crime with post-event
information; or (c) artificially increased the eyewitness's confidence. (See
Table 1, Step 1)
Obtaining the maximum amount of accurate information from
eyewitnesses is an important factor in preventing wrongful convictions.
For instance, a comprehensive study of criminal investigations by the Rand
Corporation indicated that the most important determinant of whether a
case is solved is the completeness and accuracy of the eyewitness
testimony in the case.170 In addition, the trier of fact is more likely to
render a correct verdict if detailed and accurate accounts of the crime are
presented at trial. 171 Detailed and accurate eyewitness accounts further
contribute to the just resolution of criminal cases because they help law
enforcement obtain confessions from guilty suspects and also permit
defense attorneys to more effectively represent innocent defendants.
172
(See Table 1, Step L.A.)
Assessing whether law enforcement interviews have contaminated an
eyewitness's memory with post-event information is vital because
scientific research shows that post-event information not only affects an
eyewitness's verbal reports of the crime, but also his or her ability to
recognize the perpetrator of a crime. 173 (See Table 1, Step 1.B.2.)
Determining whether an eyewitness's confidence has been artificially
increased during an interview, an identification procedure, or by other
means, is also essential. If this has occurred prior to taking a statement of
the eyewitness's confidence in the accuracy of his or her identification, the
statement of confidence has little or no probative value in assessing
170 Fisher, supra note 104, at 732; Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 53.
171 Fisher, supra note 104, at 732.
172 See id. ("On the one hand, it reduces the need to conduct extensive interrogations with
suspects, because they are more likely to admit guilt when faced with thorough eyewitness
information .... On the other hand, the more evidence defense attorneys can marshal, the better they
can defend their clients. In short, all concerned profit from having more complete and accurate
eyewitness evidence." (citations omitted)).
173 Loftus & Greene, supra note 106, at 333.
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identification accuracy. 174 Because eyewitness confidence is the factor that
jurors and judges rely on most heavily when evaluating the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony, they need to know when the eyewitness's
confidence has been artificially increased by a law enforcement interview
or other means prior to taking a statement of the eyewitness's confidence
in the accuracy of his or her identification. 175 (See Table 1, Step 1.C.)
Scientific guidelines for evaluating the fairness and completeness of
eyewitness interviews are discussed below.
176
The second component of the method for analyzing eyewitness
accuracy is for judges and attorneys to ascertain if the identification
procedures in the case were fair and unbiased. (See Table 1, Step 2) This
assessment can be made by applying the scientific principles that are
delineated later in this Article. 117
The final component of the method for analyzing eyewitness accuracy
requires judges and attorneys to evaluate which eyewitness factors during
the crime likely increased or decreased the accuracy of the eyewitness
testimony and identification. (See Table 1, Steps 3.A.-B.) A list of the
most common eyewitness factors that affect eyewitness accuracy during a
crime are described in a subsequent section. 1
78
If judges or attorneys determine that the eyewitness interview or
identification procedures were significantly biased, then the accuracy of
the eyewitness's identification is highly questionable unless the eyewitness
conditions were exceptionally good (e.g., the eyewitness victim was
kidnapped and had prolonged, repeated exposure to his or her abductor) or
there is reliable, valid corroborating evidence establishing the accuracy of
the eyewitness testimony. As Koehnken, Malpass, and Wolfgater stated:
Valid implementation of eyewitness identification using line-
ups and photo spreads demands especially careful
preparation. Once a mistake it made, it cannot be corrected.
An identification of a suspect under suggestive conditions
early in an investigation cannot simply be rectified by later
conducting a fair line-up. Various psychological mechanisms
result in the witness retaining the effects of errors made in
174 See Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 855 ("Several studies have identified
post-event factors that significantly increase the confidence, but not the accuracy, of eyewitness
testimony. These factors include post-event questioning, confirming feedback, and repeating questions
of witnesses. Thus, by the time of trial, eyewitness confidence has little probative value in assessing
eyewitness accuracy because of the many factors that affect eyewitness confidence but not accuracy."
(footnotes omitted)).
171 Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 620.
176 See infra Part VI (discussing guidelines for evaluating the fairness of eyewitness interviews).
177 See infra Part VII (discussing guidelines for evaluating the fairness of identification
procedures).
... See infra Part VIII (providing a list of the common eyewitness factors during a crime that
affect eyewitness accuracy).
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previous recognition tests. There are no procedures that can
reliably rule out the possibility that earlier mistakes will be
maintained at a later identification.
7 9
In short, once law enforcement has contaminated an eyewitness's
memory of the perpetrator of the crime by conducting a biased eyewitness
interview or identification procedure, the error cannot be corrected by
subsequently conducting fair procedures.180  (See Table 1, Step 2.B.)
Therefore, not only should an identification of a suspect that is a product of
biased interview or identification be presumed to be inaccurate, but any
subsequent identification by the eyewitness whose memory has been
contaminated should also be presumed to be inaccurate even if it results in
a fair identification procedure later.
In contrast, if law enforcement conducted fair and unbiased eyewitness
interviews and identification procedures, then the eyewitness identification
and testimony is more likely to be accurate even if the eyewitness
conditions were somewhat less than ideal. Accordingly, when assessing
the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, judges and attorneys should always
first analyze the eyewitness interviews and identification procedures. (See
Table 1, Steps 1.-2.)
Of course, no method can definitively determine if an eyewitness has
made an accurate identification. This method, however, provides a
comprehensive analytical framework for identifying and organizing the
myriad of disparate factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness
testimony. It also alerts judges and attorneys to the many different types of
eyewitness factors that affect identification accuracy. Perhaps most
importantly, it also provides judges and attorneys with a method for
integrating their knowledge of eyewitness factors into their decisions about
the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Accordingly, the use of this method
substantially increases the probability that attorneys and judges will
correctly assess eyewitness accuracy.
There are other advantages to using this method. It emphasizes the
importance of the State conducting fair and unbiased interviews and
identification procedures. The method's emphasis on fair and unbiased
procedures is justified not only because it is logical (if the methodology of
an investigation is invalid, then its results are likely to be invalid) and
supported by empirical evidence, but also because the fairness of the
eyewitness interviews and identification procedures are generally within
'79 Koehnken et al., supra note 130, at 208; see also Susan R. Klein, Identifying and
(Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1065 (2001); Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 58, at 15 (setting forth
a different hypothesis on how contamination affects an eyewitness's memory); Michael S. Wogalter et
al., A National Survey of US Police on Preparation and Conduct of Identification Lineups, 10
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 69, 78 (2004).
18o Wogalter et al., supra note 179, at 78.
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the State's control and can easily be documented by videotaping them.18 '
On the other hand, the State cannot control the eyewitness factors that
affected the eyewitness's ability during a crime to make an accurate
identification.18 2  Moreover, there is generally no objective record of the
crime or of the eyewitness factors that affected the accuracy of the
eyewitness testimony.
This method also provides the State with a strong incentive to conduct
fair interviews and identification procedures because they can significantly
strengthen the State's case at trial. Furthermore, the State can achieve the
goal of conducting fair and unbiased eyewitness interviews and
identification procedures without incurring either an unreasonable financial
or administrative burden.183  This emphasis in the method is further
warranted because the best way to prevent and reduce eyewitness error is
"S' Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 582; Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note
19, at 864-65. In effect, the method for analyzing the accuracy of eyewitness testimony delineated in
this Article distinguishes between system variables and estimator variables. System variables are
factors "over which the justice system has control, whereas . . . estimator variables are beyond the
control of the justice system." Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 582. "The number of foils
[i.e., known innocent members] in a line-up, the selection of line-up members, and questioning
techniques are examples of system variables." Douglas J. Narby et al., The Effects of Witness, Target,
and Situational Factors on Eyewitness Identifications, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION 23-24 (Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al. eds., 1996). "Some examples of estimator
variables are the level of stress experienced by the witness during the crime, and the degree to which
the witness was distracted from attending to a perpetrator's characteristics." Id. at 23. The estimation
of how much these variables influence the accuracy of identifications is subject to biases and error. Id.
at 24. Thus, in the method for analyzing eyewitness accuracy discussed in this Article, the factors
pertaining to whether law enforcement during the eyewitness interview obtained the maximum amount
of information from the eyewitness, contaminated the eyewitness's memory of the crime, or artificially
increased eyewitness confidence, and whether the identification procedures were fair and unbiased are
all system variables because they generally are within the control of the criminal justice system. See
Table 1, Steps 1-2. In contrast, the factors during the crime that likely increased or decreased
eyewitness accuracy are all estimator variables. See Tbl. 1, Step 3.
182 See Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 582 (discussing the difference between
system variables and estimator variables: system variables are eyewitness factors that the criminal
justice system can generally control while estimator variables are eyewitness factors that it cannot
control).
183 See Michael R. Headley, Note, Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for Process
Long Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 681,700 (2002); Amy Klobuchar et
al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County's Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHiCs 381, 409 (2006) (discussing how a pilot project that implemented
double-blind, sequential lineup procedures was "extremely efficient" and, as Minnetonka Police Chief
Joy Rikala noted: "There [are] no cost implications of this. It's negligible."). Fisher and Schreiber
state that Britain has adapted national standards for interviewing eyewitnesses based on the cognitive
interview. Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 56. They also point out:
[T]raining practices differ widely across countries. The most advanced and rigorous
training is found in Britain, where police often collaborate with academic
researchers to develop and evaluate training programs ... as have Australia, New
Zealand, and Israel. We find it interesting that the United States and Canada, which
have produced many of the leading theoretical advances in the psychology of
memory, have not kept pace with their western counterparts by incorporating this
knowledge into police training programs.
Id. at 57. The widespread use of the cognitive interview in several different countries supports the
proposition that its implementation is both practical and cost efficient.
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for the State to conduct fair and unbiased interviews and identification
procedures.'
4
Finally, though the method provides scientific guidelines for assessing
eyewitness accuracy, as is discussed in Part IX, we also recognize that
there are some limited circumstances where policy considerations may
require the admission of an eyewitness identification at trial even though
the method indicates that the identification should be presumed to be
inaccurate.
85
In the next three sections, scientific guidelines for assessing the
fairness of eyewitness interviews and identification procedures and a list of
eyewitness factors that commonly affect eyewitness accuracy in criminal
trials are discussed. The Appendix contains a form that will aid judges and
attorneys in applying this method to eyewitness testimony.
VI. EVALUATING THE EYEWITNESS INTERVIEWS
(THE "COGNITIVE INTERVIEW"): TABLE 1, STEP 1
Law enforcement officers are generally not trained to interview
eyewitnesses, but rather only to interrogate suspects. 186 Accordingly, when
law enforcement officers conduct interviews of eyewitnesses they often
make three types of errors: (1) they fail to obtain much of the information
that an eyewitness knows about a crime; (2) they contaminate an
eyewitness's memory of the crime; and (3) they create an unwarranted
increase in an eyewitness's confidence in the accuracy of his or her
testimony and identification.1
87
In the 1980s, Ronald Fisher and Edward Geiselman began developing
an interviewing technique which reduces the errors that law enforcement
officers generally make when interviewing eyewitnesses. 188  Scientific
studies of their cognitive interview in the laboratory and in field studies
184 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 864-65.
185 We are referring to situations where the police are acting in good faith, but necessity requires
them to use a suggestive identification procedure. One example is using a showup with an eyewitness
when the police believe that they have apprehended the perpetrator shortly after the crime has occurred.
See infra note 347. In such instances, where possible the police should follow proper procedures in
conducting the showup. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWrINESS EVIDENCE:
A TRAINER'S MANUAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 30-31 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/
eyewitness/1 88678.pdf [hereinafter NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE].
186 Fisher, supra note 104, at 733; Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 583.
187 Fisher, supra note 104, at 755; Judges, supra note 119, at 249, 250, 252. For example, in
Florida:
The "standard police interview" was characterized by constant interruptions,
excessive use of a predetermined list of questions with an expectation that witnesses
could provide answers, and questions that were timed inappropriately . . . if the
witness was describing one of the perpetrators, the officer, might switch the line of
questioning to the actions of another perpetrator.
Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 55 (citations omitted).
188 Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 582-83.
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show that it increases the amount of accurate information obtained from
eyewitnesses by thirty-five to seventy-five percent over standard police
interviews. 89  It also decreases the probability of contaminating the
eyewitness's memory of the crime or artificially inflating their
confidence.' 90 The cognitive interview forms the basis for the interviewing
techniques that the National Institute of Justice recommended in its
Training Manual for Law Enforcement.' 9
The following scientific guidelines derived from the above mentioned
sources can be used by judges and attorneys to assess whether law
enforcement obtained the maximum amount of information from the
eyewitness; whether they contaminated the eyewitness's memory of the
crime; and whether they increased the eyewitness's confidence in the
accuracy of his or her identification.
The factors for maximizing the amount of information obtained from
the eyewitness are divided into three categories: pre-interview preparation,
conducting the interview, and concluding the interview. Brief explanations
follow for each guideline and the guidelines are in bold.
A. Factors Relevant to Maximizing the Information Obtained from the
Eyewitness
1. Pre-Interview Preparation
a. When circumstances permit, the interview should be
held as soon as possible after the crime.
92
Scientific studies show that eyewitnesses begin to forget the
details of the crime very quickly, so the interview should be
conducted as soon as the eyewitness is physically and
emotionally capable of being interviewed and the exigencies
of investigating the crime permit. 93
b. The interviewer should review all information about
the crime prior to the interview.
This guideline allows an interviewer to conduct a more
thorough and complete interview. 1
94
189 Id. at 584.
190 Fisher, supra note 104, at 752.
191 See Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 590; NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185,
at 10-12.
192 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 13; Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 11.
193 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 13; see also Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at
69 (discussing another reason for conducting the eyewitness interview as soon as possible after the
crime: "The more likely prophylactic approach to minimizing the influence of suggestive questioning
is to conduct an effective witness interview shortly after the critical event, before the witness has been
exposed to the influence of the misleading suggestions.").
194 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 13.
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c. The interview should be conducted in a comfortable
environment, and distractions and interruptions should
be minimized.
An eyewitness who is comfortable and relaxed and is not
distracted or interrupted is likely to recall more information
about the crime. 95
d. The resources needed to conduct the interview (e.g.,
pens, notepad, video recorder) should be obtained prior
to the interview so it does not have to be interrupted to
get these items.
Interruptions interfere with the eyewitness's ability to
remember the crime.
1 96
e. The eyewitness interview should be videotaped.
Videotaping ensures that judges, attorneys, and jurors can
evaluate the interview and that there is an accurate and
complete record of the eyewitness testimony prior to his or
her exposure to post-event information. It also allows the
interviewer to focus on what the eyewitness is saying rather
than on note taking. 9 7  Finally, it provides the eyewitness
with an effective way of refreshing his or recollection before
testifying at trial.
2. Conducting the Interview
When conducting the interview, the interviewer should:
195Id. Law enforcement rarely meets this guideline. Fisher, supra note 104, at 756. For
example, patrol officers, who usually conduct the initial interview of eyewitnesses, do so under very
poor conditions, such as "general confusion and background noise, high witness arousal, severe time
pressure, etc. They are pressed by their supervisors to file their reports quickly, even if at the cost of
diminished information." Id.
196 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 13.
1971d. at 21; see also Fisher, supra note 104, at 745 (stating that videotaping a witness's response
minimizes "information-overload"). Unfortunately, law enforcement does not generally record
eyewitness interviews. See Fisher, supra note 104, at 755 ("The value of tape recording interviews is
obvious in terms of exposing police errors. One ought to be able to uncover, at lease in theory, whether
an item of knowledge was 'constructed' by the interview process or whether it was based on the
witness's earlier perception of the original event."). Sometimes, however, the characteristics of the
ideal eyewitness interview conflict with one another, or may need to yield to more compelling
considerations. Take the frequent circumstance where a police officer interviews an eyewitness or
victim at the crime scene only minutes after the crime. Time is of the essence: the quicker the officer
can obtain a description of the perpetrator, the quicker the police can begin searching for the
perpetrator, hopefully before he or she has gotten too far from the crime scene. At-the-scene
interviewing minimizes the time between the crime and the interview, but may make it impractical for
the officer to learn anything about the crime prior to the interview, or to transport the eyewitness to a
comfortable environment, or to videotape the interview. The situation may be even more exigent if the
interview must be conducted while the eyewitness is receiving medical treatment, or the eyewitness is
about to be taken to the hospital.
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a. Establish and maintain rapport with the eyewitness
and minimize his or her anxiety.
Relaxed eyewitnesses provide more information and
eyewitnesses are often traumatized by the crimes they
witnessed.' 98
b. Inquire about the eyewitness's condition.
This question helps build rapport and alerts the interviewer to
any condition that might impair the eyewitness's ability to
remember the crime (e.g., intoxication, shock, drugs). 99
c. Instruct the eyewitness to: (1) volunteer information; 2°
(2) report all details they remember about the crime even
if the information seems trivial and unimportant; 20 1 and
(3) inform the eyewitness about the type and degree of
detail of information the interviewer needs.
20 2
These rules encourage the eyewitness to be active during the
interview. This is vital because it is the eyewitness, not the
interviewer, who has information about the crime, and
unprompted information tends to be more accurate than
information given in response to questions.20 3  These
instructions also increase the likelihood that the eyewitness
will not withhold any information about the crime and
understands the kinds of information and the degree of detail
that the interviewer needs.2°
d. Ask the eyewitness to mentally recreate the crime.
This can be done by asking the eyewitness to think about his
198 See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 14 ("The development of rapport between the
witness and interviewer will make the witness more comfortable during the interview process.
Comfortable witnesses will generally provide more information."); Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence,
supra note 13, at 56. Police officers often have difficulty establishing rapport with eyewitnesses. See
Fisher, supra note 104, at 755. Fisher notes that "I have found in the various interviewing workshops I
have conducted that women were generally more effective interviewers than men." Id. at 756.
199 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 1I.
200 d. at 16.
201 Id. at 20; Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 57.
202 Fisher, supra note 104, at 747; Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 62.
203 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 16, 19. Fisher and Schreiber propose:
Interviewers can induce witnesses to take more active roles and to volunteer
information by (a) explicitly requesting them to do so, (b) asking open-ended
questions, (c) not interrupting witnesses during their narrative responses, and (d)
constructing the social dynamic so that witnesses perceive themselves to be the
experts and therefore the dominant person in the conversation. This last point is
especially important when children are being interviewed.
Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 61.
204 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 19.
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or her thoughts and feelings during the crime.20 5 By mentally
recreating the crime, the eyewitness will be able to recall
more information about the crime.
20 6
e. Use primarily open-ended questions during the
interview (e.g., What did the perpetrator look like?). 0 7
Open-ended questions give the eyewitness control of the
interview.2 °8 They also furnish the eyewitness with his or her
best chance to filly disclose the details of a crime.2°9 In
addition, responses to opened-ended questions tend to be
more accurate than responses to other types of questions and
210promote more attentive listening by the interviewer.
f. Ask close-ended questions only when they are needed
to augment open-ended questions (e.g., What color was
the perpetrator's hair?).
Open-ended questions are preferable because close-ended
questions limit the amount and scope of the information
obtained from the eyewitness. 21 1  Nonetheless, close-ended
questions are appropriate when the eyewitness has not
disclosed important information in his or her responses to
212open-ended questions.
205 Id. at 20. Wells suggests that an officer can have an eyewitness mentally recreate the crime
by: "asking them to form an image or impression of the environmental aspects of the original scene
(e.g., the location of objects in a room); to comment on any emotional reactions and feelings (e.g.,
surprise, anger) at the time; and to describe any sounds, smells, and physical conditions (e.g., hot,
humid, smoky) that were present." Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 57.
2'6 Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 59; NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 20.
207 See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 11 ("An open-ended question allows for an
unlimited response from the witness in his/her own words (e.g., 'What can you tell me about the
perpetrator?' or 'Tell me in your own words what happened').").208 Id.; Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 843.
209 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 11.
210 id.
211 Id. The National Institute of Justice's Training Manual indicated that
[a]lthough it is preferable to use open-ended questioning, the investigator should
follow with more directed questions if the witness is unresponsive to open-ended
questions or provides imprecise responses. If, for example, when answering an
open-ended question, the witness states that the perpetrator was dressed in 'shabby'
clothing, the investigator should ask the witness to elaborate on the type of clothing
(e.g., "What do you mean by 'shabby'?").
Id.; Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 57.2 12 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 11. The National Institute of Justice's Training
Manual, however, suggests:
For each new topic of information being sought, the investigator should begin with
open-ended questions and augment them with closed-ended questions if necessary.
For example, if, after having elicited all information from the witness about the
perpetrator, the next topic of information is the getaway car, the investigator should
begin this line of inquiry with open-ended questions about the car.
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g. Avoid interrupting the eyewitness.
Interruptions disrupt memory and discourage the eyewitness
from volunteering information.213
h. Allow for pauses when an eyewitness stops talking and
before asking the next question.
This ensures that the eyewitness has completed his or her
response.214
i. Tailor questions to the eyewitness's narrative rather
than asking a standard set of questions.
Each eyewitness's mental representation of a crime is unique;
therefore, the interviewer's questions should correspond to
the eyewitness's memory of the crime. 215 For example, if the
eyewitness is describing the perpetrator's car, the interviewer
should not be asking questions about the perpetrator's
appearance.216
j. Encourage nonverbal communications from the
eyewitness such as drawings and gestures, especially from
children eyewitnesses or eyewitnesses who are not fluent
in English.217
Some information is difficult to express verbally and some
aspects of events are expressed better nonverbally.
Moreover, some eyewitnesses have limited verbal skills.
k. Ask the eyewitness, "Is there anything else I should
have asked you?"
This question helps insure that the eyewitness has disclosed
all the information he or she knows about the crime. 218
3. Concluding the Interview
a. The eyewitness should be encouraged to contact the
2 13 
Id. at 16.2 14 
Id. at 17.
215 Id.; Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 59.
216 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 17.
2 17 
Id. at 20. Fisher & Schreiber stated:
Ideally the response format should be compatible with the witness's mental
representation of the event, thereby minimizing the need to transform the mental
representation into an overt response. For example, if an event is inherently spatial
(e.g., locations of objects within a room), then witnesses should respond spatially,
for example, by drawing a sketch of the room or by placing model objects within a
(model) room.
Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 62 (internal citations omitted).2 1 8NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 19.
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interviewer if he or she remembers additional facts about
the crime.
Eyewitnesses frequently recall additional facts about the
crime after the interview is over.219
b. The interviewer should review written documentation
with the eyewitness and ask the eyewitness if there is
anything he or she wishes to change, add, or emphasize.
Doing this helps insure that the information has been
accurately recorded and allows the eyewitness to recall more
information about the crime.220
c. Thank the eyewitness for his or her time and
cooperation.
Expressing gratitude to the eyewitness strengths rapport with
the eyewitness and encourages future cooperation.
B. "Contamination" of the Eyewitness's Memory
To prevent contaminating the eyewitness's memory and to assess
whether the eyewitness's memory has been contaminated, the interviewer
should (See Table 1, Step l.B.2.):
1. Separate the eyewitnesses and tell them not to discuss
the details of the crime with other eyewitnesses222 and to
avoid media accounts of the crime.
223
If an eyewitness hears another eyewitness's or the media's
account of the crime, this could alter the first eyewitness's
memory of the crime and create a false consensus among the
eyewitnesses about details of the crime.224
2. Determine if an eyewitness has spoken to another
eyewitness or anyone else about the crime or been
exposed to media accounts of the crime.
Exposure to these sources could mean that the eyewitness's
memory of the crime has been altered by post-event
2 9 Id. at 20; Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 63.
2 2 0 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 21. Fisher and Schreiber suggest that "[tihe
interviewer should also point out in a nonchallenging way any ambiguities or contradictory statements
within the witness's statement and ask the witness to clarify these matters, even if that means indicating
that the witness is not certain about the matter." Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 63.
221 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 21.
noId. at 12.
223 Id.; Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 60.
224 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 12.
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information.225
3. Ascertain the nature of the eyewitness's prior law
enforcement contact related to the crime being
investigated. This includes any prior interviews by law
enforcement or participation in any type of identification
procedure.
This information puts the eyewitness's information into
context and allows the interviewer to determine if post-event
information or a biased identification procedure contaminated
the eyewitness's memory of the crime.22 6
4. Avoid volunteering any information about the
perpetrator or the crime.
Doing so could alter the eyewitness's memory about the
227crime.
5. Tell the eyewitness not to guess and to indicate if he or
she feels any uncertainty about an answer.
Guessing can alter the eyewitness's memory.228
6. Refrain from (a) using suggestive or leading questions
(e.g., "Was the car red?");22 9 (b) disclosing information to
the eyewitness about the crime the interviewer learned
from other sources; or (c) using multiple choice questions.
All these responses supply post-event information to an
eyewitness, which can alter an eyewitness's memory of the
crime. Moreover, post-event information not only affects an
225 Id. If two or more eyewitnesses are victimized by or observe a crime, it is understandable that
they may discuss what happened while waiting for the police to arrive. Clearly no blame should be
placed on the police for what the eyewitnesses did before the police had an opportunity to intervene;
nor can any blame be assigned to the eyewitnesses, who do not know that discussing the matter with
each other may contaminate their memories of what happened. Thus, the occurrence of such a
discussion prior to the first police interview cannot by itself mandate suppression of eyewitness
testimony; but it is a factor for the judge to consider, in making an overall assessment of the accuracy
and reliability of their testimony. Moreover, if the eyewitnesses make an in-court identification at trial,
defense counsel should be permitted to elicit that the eyewitnesses had discussed the facts among
themselves, and to elicit expert testimony about the resultant risk of contamination and inaccuracy.226 Id. at 14; see also Brigham et al., supra note 90, at 14 (discussing how "witnesses are highly
susceptible to suggestions regarding their memory for the previously viewed event"); Shaw &
McClure, supra note 118, at 647 (discussing how repeated questioning of an eyewitness can increase
the risk of contaminating the eyewitness's memory); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Distortions in
Eyewitnesses'Recollections: Can the Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10 PSYCHOL.
SCi. 138, 138 (1999).
227 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 23; Fisher & Schreiber, supra note 143, at 60.
228 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 20; Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note
13, at 57.229 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 11.
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eyewitness's memory of the crime, but it can also impair an
eyewitness's ability to recognize the perpetrator of the
crime.23°
C. Eyewitness Confidence
To prevent increasing the confidence of the eyewitness and to
determine if it has been artificially increased, the interviewer should (See
Table 1, Step 1.C.):
1. Use the cognitive interview.
It minimizes the probability that the interviewer will increase
the eyewitness's confidence.23'
2. Avoid disclosing to the eyewitness: (a) that another
eyewitness has identified the same suspect; (b) what
another eyewitness said about the crime or the
perpetrator; or (c) that there is other evidence that
confirms the eyewitness's testimony or identification.
All these factors artificially increase eyewitness
confidence.232
3. Determine if the eyewitness had contact with other
eyewitnesses, the media, or other law enforcement officers
and the nature of that contact to assess whether it has
increased the eyewitness's confidence (e.g., the eyewitness
has been told that another eyewitness also identified the
suspect).233
4. Avoid giving the eyewitness any type of confirming
feedback (e.g., "Good, you have identified the suspect") or
exposing the eyewitness to unnecessary, repeated
questioning.
23 0Id. at 23; see also Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 846 ("Law officers can
convey post-event information to eyewitnesses in a variety of ways, from overtly volunteering
information to the eyewitness, to asking leading questions, to encouraging guessing by the eyewitness,
to offering confirming feedback." (footnotes omitted)).
231 For a discussion of the cognitive interview, see supra Part VI. See also RONALD P. FISHER &
R. EDWARD GEISELMAN, MEMORY-ENHANCING TECHNIQUES FOR INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, THE
COGNITIVE INTERVIEW 38-39 (1992); PIr Anders Granhag et al., The Cognitive Interview and Its
Effect on Witnesses' Confidence, 10 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 37, 50 (2004).
232 Helen M. Paterson & Richard I. Kemp, Comparing Methods of Encountering Post-Event
Information: The Power of Co-Witness Suggestion, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1083, 1098
(2006); Wells & Bradfield, supra note 118, at 362.
233 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 12 ("Media information may contaminate the
witness's memory. Media requests for a story or offers of compensation may encourage a witness to
fabricate information.... Witnesses should not hear others' accounts because they may be influenced
by that information.").
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These factors significantly increase eyewitness confidence.2 34
5. Take a statement of the eyewitness's confidence in the
accuracy of his or her identification of the suspect as the
perpetrator of the crime immediately after the
identification procedure and prior to the eyewitness
receiving any feedback about his or her identification.235
Eyewitness confidence is highly malleable; therefore, a
statement of the eyewitness confidence should be taken
immediately after the identification.236
This guideline recognizes that at some point the eyewitness is
likely to receive positive or confirming feedback.237 Indeed,
law enforcement officials may have legitimate reasons for
providing such feedback to the eyewitness. 238  These
234 Bradfield et al., supra note 12, at 113; Shaw & McClure, supra note 118, at 630; Andrew E.
Taslitz, Convicting the Guilty, The ABA Takes a Stand, 19 CRIM. JUST. 18, 23 (2005); Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 626; Wells & Bradfield, supra note 118, at 374.
235 Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 635. The authors support
this suggestion, stating:
This recommendation is based on the observation that confidence statements from
eyewitnesses can be affected dramatically by events occurring after the
identification (postidentification events) that have nothing to do with the witness's
memory. As noted earlier, the confidence that an eyewitness expresses in his or her
identification during testimony is the most powerful single determinant of whether
or not observers will believe the eyewitness made an accurate identification. By
recording the eyewitness's confidence at the time of the identification,
postidentification factors (which have little to do with the witness's memory) will
not yet have influenced the confidence judgment. If the confidence that an
eyewitness expresses at trial is noticeably higher than it was at the time of the
identification, then fact finders should consider the possibility that this inflation of
confidence came from sources other than the goodness of the eyewitness's memory.
Id.; see also Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 864.
236 Leippe & Eisenstadt, supra note 117, at 417; Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 586;
see also supra Part III.F. (discussing eyewitnesses' tendency to be overconfident in the accuracy of
their identifications and the malleability of eyewitness confidence); WEITEN, supra note 14, at 230-31.
237 The eyewitness leaming that the person he or she identified was subsequently indicted is likely
to boost the eyewitness's confidence that he or she picked out the "right" person. If the eyewitness
learns that the defendant is also charged with committing other, similar crimes (a fact that is accessible
to the public at large), this, too, will boost his or her confidence.
238 The rights and concerns of the eyewitness must also be taken into account. Eyewitnesses (and
particularly victims) often complain that they are ignored or treated without courtesy or respect by
investigators, attorneys, and the court. See John Hagan, Victims Before the Law: A Study of Victim
Involvement in the Criminal Justice Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 324-28 (1982);
Deborah P. Kelly, Delivering Legal Services to Victims: An Evaluation and Prescription, 9 JUST. SYS.
J. 62, 76 (1984) (reporting that the suggested reform witnesses requested most often was that police
should provide them with more information about the investigation); Deborah P. Kelly, Victims'
Perceptions of Criminal Justice, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 15, 19 (1984); Dean G. Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto,
Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in Criminal Proceedings for Victims: Potential Effects on
Psychological Functioning, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 7, 22 (1987) (reporting witness dissatisfaction with
how they are treated by the criminal justice system); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the
Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 103 (1999). Simple compassion for an eyewitness's
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concerns underscore the importance of asking the eyewitness
to estimate his or her degree of certainty immediately after
the eyewitness's identification of the defendant (and
videorecording that statement), as a check against a
subsequent increase in the eyewitness's confidence from
outside sources. If an eyewitness's confidence in the
accuracy of the identification increases by the time of trial,
the judge should permit the defense attorney to use the
eyewitness's earlier statement of confidence to impeach the
eyewitness's current statement of confidence.239 Moreover,
the trial judge should consider permitting expert testimony
that explains how an eyewitness's confidence can increase
over time, and why this does not indicate that the
identification is correct.240
TABLE 2:
SCIENTIFIC GUIDELINES FOR FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
1. Whenever possible, law enforcement should use photo arrays and lineups
only when there is probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime.
2. Before conducting an identification procedure, it should be determined
whether the eyewitness has previously seen the suspect.
3. Only one suspect should be included in every identification procedure.
4. The number of lineup participants should be increased.
5. The suspect should not stand out from the foils.
6. Law enforcement should use sequential identification procedures.
7. The lineup administrator should not know the identity of the suspect.
8. Eyewitnesses should be given cautionary instructions.
feelings might dictate that he or she be provided at least some additional information about the case;
law enforcement officials may have a legitimate concern that the failure to do so might so offend the
victim or eyewitness that he or she will refuse to subject him or herself to the ordeal of reliving the
crime in the courtroom and, in particular, cross-examination that may prove upsetting or embarrassing.
239 Where a prior statement by an eyewitness is inconsistent with that eyewitness's testimony at
trial, the prior statement should be admitted to impeach the testimony. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 613(b);
CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 26:2 (7th ed. 2000). A complete, 180-degree
contradiction is not required; it suffices that the prior statement leaves a significantly different
impression than the testimony being impeached. Id. § 26:15. To preclude a defendant from bringing
out such inconsistencies can constitute a violation of the right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).
240 See supra Part IRD. (discussing expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification).
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9. All identification procedures should be videotaped.
10. An eyewitness should make a clear statement of his or her confidence at
the time of the identification and prior to receiving any feedback.
11. Once a mistake is made in an identification procedure, it cannot be
corrected.
VII. GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING THE FAIRNESS
OF IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
The following eleven guidelines, derived from scientific studies of
identification procedures, can be used to objectively evaluate whether a
photo array or lineup was conducted in a fair and unbiased manner.241 For
detailed guidelines on the proper use of mug books, composite images, and
showups, consult the National Institute of Justice's Training Manual.242
The guidelines for conducting fair and unbiased photo arrays and lineups
are in bold and a brief rationale for each guideline is included.
1. Whenever possible, law enforcement should use a
lineup or photo array only when there is probable cause
to believe the suspect committed the crime.
Most erroneous eyewitness identifications result from
identification procedures that do not include the perpetrator
of the crime.2 " If law enforcement conducts photo arrays
and lineups only when probable cause exists that the suspect
committed the crime, the number of perpetrator-absent
lineups and photo arrays, and therefore the number of
erroneous identifications of an innocent suspect, will be
significantly reduced.245
"Probable cause" is the quantum of suspicion that is
required before the police may lawfully arrest someone and
241 Some of these procedures are already practiced by law enforcement officials; we include them
here not to suggest otherwise, but because they belong in any description of best practices that should
be followed.
242 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 25-27, 30-32.
243 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 856.
244 See Wells & Olson, supra note 13, at 286 ("Research repeatedly shows that culprit-absent
lineups present great problems for eyewitnesses.").
245 See Steven Penrod, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: How Well Are Witnesses and Police
Performing?, 18 CRIM. JUST. 36, 46 (2003); Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 856
("[L]aw enforcement agencies should distinguish between those eyewitnesses used to produce
investigatory leads and those used to establish a defendant's guilt. An eyewitness used to generate
leads in a case should not also be used to establish a defendant's guilt at trial."); see also Wells &
Olson, supra note 13, at 286 (protesting that "investigators will place a suspect in a lineup for the
slightest of reasons (e.g., a mere hunch)").
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charge him or her with a specific crime. 246  Thus, if the
suspect has already been lawfully arrested for the crime in
question, the probable cause standard suggested here imposes
no burdens or restrictions on law enforcement. When police,
however, believe that a suspect committed the crime, but lack
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, including
such a suspect in a photo array247 or lineup 248 can be a highly
246 See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369-70 (2003). Although the term is codified in the
Fourth Amendment ("[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ") and has been the
subject of countless court decisions since the ratification of the Amendment, no clear definition of it
exists. The Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he probable-cause standard is incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the
totality of the circumstances." Id. at 371; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). Moreover, "'the quanta ... of proof appropriate in
ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to" determinations of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at
235 (citation omitted). Thus, "[f]inely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the [probable-cause] decision."
Id. Rather, "[tihe substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (citation omitted). A search or seizure of a person "must be supported
by probable cause particularized with respect to that person." Id. (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
91(1979)).247 Not only is a photo array much easier to arrange than a lineup, but law enforcement officials
may also conduct photo arrays before or after arraignment without first obtaining judicial authorization,
and without notice to the suspect or his attorney. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 318-21
(1973); supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
2U This is appropriate when:
(I) A suspect could voluntarily participate in a lineup.
(2) Where the suspect is already in custody on other charges, at least one court
has held that he can be forced to participate in a lineup regarding additional crimes if
the police have at least a "reasonable suspicion" that he is guilty of those crimes.
United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1969). "Reasonable
suspicion" requires less evidence or information than probable cause, and permits
only temporary detention and, sometimes a frisk, rather than a custodial arrest and
full search. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1968). Reasonable suspicion
exists, the Court has held, when "the detaining officers ... have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person... of criminal activity." United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). For a detailed discussion of the
difficulties in defining or distinguishing probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 470-77, § 9.5(a) (4th ed. 2004).
(3) At least one court permitted police to compel such a suspect to participate in
other-crime lineups without first showing either probable cause or reasonable
suspicion as to the other crimes. See State v. Wilks, 358 N.W.2d 273, 277-78 (Wis.
1984).
(4) A prosecutor might persuasively argue by analogy to other Supreme Court
decisions upholding grand jury subpoenas (for which no preliminary showing of
reasonableness is needed) compelling a suspect to provide a handwriting exemplar
or a voice exemplar. See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1973); see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811, 816-17 (1985) (suggesting that a court might have authority to order a suspect
to submit to being fingerprinted where the police have shown "reasonable
suspicion" that he is the culprit). Placing a suspect in a lineup without probable
cause, however, probably does not occur very often. The police may not know
where the suspect is, or may not want to alert him or her that he or she is a suspect.
Moreover, conducting a lineup requires far more preparation than showing an
eyewitness a series of photographs, and may be more intimidating to the eyewitness.
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useful step in acquiring sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause. Thus a conflict often arises between
legitimate investigative concerns, on the one hand, and the
need to safeguard against an increased risk of erroneous
identifications, on the other.
A variety of solutions exist to this dilemma. Sometimes
it is practical to postpone a photo array or lineup while the
police investigate further.249 Where there are several
eyewitnesses to a crime, police might show a photo array to
one eyewitness; if he or she identifies the defendant as the
perpetrator, the identification establishes probable cause,
which justifies an arrest and, thereafter, a lineup at which
other eyewitnesses will (hopefully) identify the defendant as
well.25°
Where a pre-probable cause lineup is necessary, the risk
of an erroneous identification can be reduced if the police
scrupulously follow the guidelines set forth in this Article: a
sequential lineup, conducted by an officer who does not
know the identity of the suspect, with at least twelve
participants, preceded by appropriate cautionary instructions,
and so on. Similarly, if police need an eyewitness to attempt
a pre-probable cause photo identification, using a photo array
has the same shortcomings as a lineup. It should be
permissible, however, to ask the eyewitness to look at a large
collection of photos or mug-shots, if they are presented in a
fair and unbiased manner, and the eyewitness is warned that
the perpetrator's picture may not be among them.25' Doing
so would reduce, though not eliminate, the risk that the
eyewitness will select the suspect's photo merely because, of
the photos shown, his photo most closely resembles the
perpetrator.252 If these procedures are followed, a court
249 If the suspect is already incarcerated on other charges, for example, there may be little concern
that he or she will commit additional crimes before an arrest is made in the pending investigation.
250 The second eyewitness's identification of the defendant would circumstantially corroborate the
reliability of the first eyewitness's identification at the pre-probable cause photo array, thereby giving
assurance of its reliability--provided, of course, that both the photo array and the lineup were fair and
unbiased.
251 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 29-35 (describing the procedures that should be
used when the police show mug-shots to eyewitnesses).
252 At least one scholar urges that an eyewitness who police use to generate leads in a case should
not be permitted to make an identification at trial. See Penrod, supra note 245. The reasons for this
assertion are that once an eyewitness identifies someone as the perpetrator, it is very unlikely that the
eyewitness will change his or her mind because of the commitment effect and the reconstructive nature
of memory. Accordingly, if the police place a suspect in a lineup based only on a hunch, there is a
much greater chance that they are conducting a culprit-absent lineup, and if the eyewitness chooses the
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should have fewer qualms about allowing that eyewitness to
make an in-court identification at trial.
2. Before conducting an identification procedure, it
should be determined whether the eyewitness has
previously seen the suspect before or after the crime.253
Studies strongly indicate that if an eyewitness has
previously seen the suspect, such as in a mug-shot, this
substantially increases the probability that the eyewitness will
select the suspect in a subsequent identification procedure
even if the suspect is innocent.
3. Only one suspect should be included in every
identification procedure.255
Studies show that including more than one suspect in an
identification procedure increases the probability that an
erroneous eyewitness identification will occur. 56 This
increased error rate occurs because multiple suspects
decrease the number of fillers25 7 (i.e., known innocent
participants) and increase the frequency with which an
eyewitness will select someone whom the police think is
suspect, it is unlikely the eyewitness will later change his or her mind. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
supra note 185, at 25-30 (stating procedures that should be followed for mug books).
253 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 857.
254 See Evan Brown et al., Memory for Faces and the Circumstances of Encounter, 62 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 311, 311-18 (1977) (discussing the results of three experiments showing that people are
much better at recognizing a face than remembering where they saw the face, and that this tendency
makes it more likely for eyewitnesses to identify an innocent suspect as the perpetrator if the
eyewitness has previously seen the innocent suspect's mug-shot); Koehnken et al., supra note 130, at
217 ("Research shows that identification errors may increase from previous exposure to a photograph
of the suspect .... Once a witness comes to a decision and expresses it, he or she may feel committed
and may be less willing to change the decision later.").
255 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 35 ("In multiple-suspect lineups, the probability of
a possible mistaken identification rises as the number of suspects in a lineup increases."). Wise et al.
also advocate for this procedure, stating:
Many lineups in the United States contain more than one suspect, even when there is
only one perpetrator who committed the crime. Research has shown that the use of
multiple suspects in identification procedures significantly increases the risk of
erroneous identifications. This increased risk occurs because multiple suspects
decrease the proportion of fillers in the lineup and increase the number of correct
responses. Putting more than one suspect in a lineup significantly increases the
probability that an eyewitness will choose an innocent suspect.
Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 857-58 (footnotes omitted).
256 Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 593; see also R. C. L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells,
Improving Eyewitness Identifications from Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup
Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556, 557 (1985).
27 A lineup or photo array contains a suspect and several known innocent individuals. Wells et
al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 584. The innocent members of an identification procedure are
referred to either as distractors, foils, or fillers. Id. at 584-85. The term "fillers" is used in this Article
because it is the term that is most commonly used by law enforcement. Id.
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guilty.2
58
4. The number of lineup participants should be increased
in identification procedures.
259
In the United States, the typical photo array or lineup
contains five or six members.260  Even if a five or six person
identification procedure is conducted in a manner that is
completely fair and unbiased, studies show that the chances
of an erroneous eyewitness identification is still
substantial.26' Studies also indicate that increasing lineup
size from six to twelve members in the United States could
reduce false identifications by fifty percent without a
significant drop in accurate identifications.
262
5. The suspect in an identification procedure should not
258 Id. In other words, in the typical six-person lineup, if you have two suspects, you have
decreased the number of foils from five to four and have increased the number of "correct" choices
(i.e., the two suspects) from one to two, thereby substantially increasing the risk of an erroneous
identification.
259 Taslitz argues:
Lineups and photo spreads should also use a sufficient number of foils to
reasonably reduce the risk of an eyewitness selecting a suspect by guessing rather
than by recognition. The reason for this is straightforward. If there are six lineup
participants, none of whom is guilty, there is a one-in-six chance that a guessing
eyewitness will wrongly select the suspect. If there is a 10-person lineup, the risk of
a mistake falls to one in ten. There is no indisputable basis for selecting one number
over another. What is clear is that bigger is better. Researchers in the area have
roundly condemned the six-person lineup common in the United States,
recommending a 10-person size. The United Kingdom's standard is a nine-person
lineup, a size that has not proven impracticable for the police to achieve. The same
principle applies to photo spreads, and the ABA policy does not make any
recommendation preferring lineups over photo spreads or vice-versa.
Taslitz, supra note 234, at 21 (internal citations omitted); see also Wise et al., Tripartite Solution,
supra note 19, at 858.
260 Avraham M. Levi & R. C. L. Lindsay, Lineup and Photo Spread Procedures: Issues
Concerning Policy Recommendations, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 776, 787 (2001); Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 62; see also ROy S. MALPASS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
RESEARCH LABORATORY, UNIV. OF TEX. AT EL PASO, A LINEUP EVALUATION "DO-IT-YOURSELF KIT"
FOR ATrORNEYS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 4-5, available at http://eyewitness.utep.edu/Documents/
DIY%20Kit.pdf. Malpass sets forth a mathematical formula for evaluating the functional size of a
lineup (i.e., if certain fillers fail to draw or draw too few choices from mock witnesses or certain fillers
draw too many choices from mock witnesses). Id.
261 Levi & Lindsay, supra note 260, at 787.
262 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 62 ("Thus, adding six additional
members to a six-person lineup reduces the chances of mistaken identification from 16.7% to 8.3%
(i.e., among those making an identification)."); see also Levi & Lindsay, supra note 260, at 787
(arguing that the use of nine- or ten-person lineups in England and twelve in Canada suggests that the
use of larger lineups will not inhibit identifications: "Available research evidence shows no decline in
correct identification from simultaneous lineups of at least 20 persons. Mug shot research suggests that
even larger lineups may not compromise correct identification rates." (internal citations omitted));
Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 63 (finding that eyewitnesses could view over 300
photos without a drop in the number of accurate identification and arguing that an increase in lineup
size could play an important role in reducing eyewitness error).
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stand out from the foils. 26 3
If a suspect stands out from the foils in an identification
procedure, it cannot be reliably determined if the
eyewitness's identification of the suspect is due to the
eyewitness's memory or the manner in which the lineup was
conducted.2 4  When this occurs, it may substantially
diminish or even eliminate the validity of the identification as
evidence of the defendant's guilt.265  There are several
procedures that are necessary to prevent this type of error.
First, the foils should generally match the eyewitness's
description of the perpetrator of the crime.266 Second,
suspects should be placed in different positions in each lineup
by having the suspect's position in the lineup randomly
determined.267 Random positioning of the suspect rather than
placing a suspect always in the same position prevents a
suspect's position in an identification procedure from
becoming common knowledge among law enforcement and
263 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 859 ("Likewise, in an identification
procedure where the suspect stands out, it cannot be determined if the eyewitness selected the suspect
because he or she recognized the suspect as the perpetrator of the crime, or because of the biasing effect
of the fillers in the indentification procedure.").
264 Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 63; see also MALPASS, supra note 260, at
2 (delineating a mathematical test for evaluating lineup bias produced by filler selection).
265 Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 63; see also MALPASS, supra note 260 at
2.
266 The National Institute of Justice's Training Manual states that police should:
Select fillers who generally fit the witness's description of the perpetrator. When
there is a limited/inadequate description of the perpetrator provided by the witness,
or when the description of the perpetrator differs significantly from the appearance
of the suspect, fillers should resemble the suspect in significant features.
This does not mean that the fillers must closely resemble the suspect ... If the
description does not fit the suspect on some characteristic (e.g., the witness
described dark hair, yet the suspect has light hair), then the fillers should match the
suspect on that characteristic rather than matching the description on that
characteristic so that the suspect does not stand out.
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 36; Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 62
("The general recommendation for selecting fillers for lineups has been to use the eyewitness's
description of the target and take any additional measures needed to make sure that the suspect does not
stand out in the lineup."). For detailed procedures in selecting fillers when the suspect does not match
the eyewitness's description, the suspect has unique non-described features, the suspect has common
non-described features, the eyewitness description of the perpetrator is unique, or there is more than
one eyewitness, see Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 632-34.267 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 36 ("If specific investigators consistently choose
the same lineup location for the suspect, this can become common knowledge among both law
enforcement officers and the general public. This could lead a witness to pick the person in that
position for reasons other than recognizing the suspect."); see also Wogalter et al., supra note 179, at
72 ("Most officers report that they usually place the suspect in the middle of both live (87%) and
photographic lineups (81%) as opposed to the beginning (left) and end (right) positions, but
approximately one-half (47%) of those who construct live lineups said that they allow suspects to
choose their location.").
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the general public.268 Third, fillers should not be reused with
the same eyewitness.269 When the same fillers are used with
a new suspect they make the suspect stand out because the
suspect is the only person not appearing in a previous
identification procedure.270  Finally, the manner in which the
lineup is conducted should not draw the eyewitness's
attention to the suspect.27'
6. Law enforcement should use sequential identification
procedures.272
In a simultaneous lineup, an eyewitness views all
participants in the lineup at the same time.273 In a sequential
lineup, members are presented individually to the
eyewitness. 274 Each lineup participant in a sequential lineup
is shown only once, and the eyewitness must decide before
seeing the next lineup participant if he or she is the
perpetrator. 275  Furthermore, the eyewitness is not told how
many participants there are in the lineup.276 Compared to
simultaneous lineups, sequential lineups reduce eyewitness
error because they tend to force an eyewitness to make an
absolute rather than a relative judgment when making an
identification.277 When an eyewitness employs an absolute
268 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 36.
269 Id. at 36-37 ("Using the same fillers with a new suspect can make the suspect stand out as the
only one not appearing in a previous lineup. This could be considered a suggestive procedure. Also,
the witness might recognize one of the fillers (from seeing him/her in a previous lineup) and
misidentify the filler as the perpetrator.").
270 Id.
271 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 185. For example, the suspect should not be the only lineup
member to repeat what the perpetrator said during the crime. See Koehnken et al., supra note 130, at
211 (explaining how other biased conditions of a lineup could make the suspect stand out from the
foils, for example, if the suspect was the only one wearing handcuffs).
272 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 860.
273 Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 63.
274 Id.
2 7 5 
Id.
276 Id.; see also Stinson et al., supra note 124, at 212 (explaining how a sequential lineup is
conducted).
277 Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 586; NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at
44. The State of New Jersey requires sequential lineups, and a New York court ordered a double-blind
sequential lineup in at least one case. Headley, supra note 183, at 699-700. Moreover:
New Jersey's reforms have influenced other states to examine the possibility of
adopting similar lineup protocols. In 2002, Illinois Governor George H. Ryan's
Commission on Capital Punishment, charged with ensuring the accuracy and
justness of capital punishment in Illinois, recommended the implementation of
eyewitness identification reforms. The North Carolina Actual Innocence
Commission created a series of recommendations in 2003 for state law enforcement
officers, including a comprehensive lineup protocol. In early 2005, the Avery Task
Force made similar recommendations for the Wisconsin criminal justice system.
The Virginia General Assembly also instructed the Virginia State Crime
20091
CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW
judgment, the eyewitness identifies the suspect because his or
her appearance matches the eyewitness's memory of the
perpetrator of the crime and not because the suspect most
closely resembles the perpetrator.278 Although one study,
conducted in Illinois, suggested that sequential identification
procedures were of dubious value, the results of that study
are flawed because of a design defect: double blind lineups
were used only for the sequential lineups and not for
simultaneous lineups. 79
Commission to create guidelines for improving lineup procedures in the
commonwealth.
Klobuchar et al., supra note 183, at 386-87 (footnotes omitted).
278 Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 613-14 ("Under
[simultaneous lineup] conditions, the relative judgment process will nevertheless yield a positive
identification because there will always be someone who looks more like the culprit than do the
remaining lineup members. The problem... therefore, is that it includes no mechanism for deciding
that the culprit is none of the people in the lineup."); Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13,
at 61.
279 In a recent study, conducted on behalf of the State of Illinois, however, Sheri H. Mecklenburg
found that the use of sequential lineups did not reduce erroneous identifications. SHERI H.
MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT
PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES iv (2006), available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/IllinoisReport.pdf ("Surprisingly, the Illinois
data did not bear out the research experiments that sequential, double-blind lineups produce a lower
rate of known false identifications. Instead, the sequential, double-blind procedures resulted in an
overall higher rate of known false identifications than did the simultaneous lineups."). Gary L. Wells,
a leading eyewitness researcher and a developer of the sequential lineup, pointed out an important
design flaw in the Illinois study:
My main reaction to this report is disappointment and concern that the design of
the study does not permit any clear conclusions. The reason that it does not permit
clear conclusions is because the simultaneous lineups never used the double-blind
procedure whereas the sequential lineups always used the double-blind procedure.
This is extremely problematic because the failure to use double-blind procedures
with the simultaneous lineups leaves open several "lineup-administrator influenced"
means by which filler identifications could be suppressed and identifications of the
suspect enhanced. These lineup-administrator influences were not available for the
sequential because the sequential was conducted using double-blind procedures.
Gary L. Wells, Gary L. Wells's Comments on the Mecklenburg Report 1 (2006), available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/llinois Project-wells-comments.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2009). Wells continues, stating:
I was shocked when I learned of the failure of the study to include a double-blind
control for the simultaneous lineups, a fact I learned only when I read the final
report. Nancy Steblay clearly states that she too had no idea that this study would
have this design flaw. I have asked Sherri [sic] Mecklenburg to correct this
misperception, but no corrections have yet been made as far as I am aware.
Id. Nancy Steblay, another prominent eyewitness expert, states, "My primary concern with the Illinois
report is that its conclusion appears to [have] . . . minimal appreciation of the underlying reasons for
these outcomes or the broader context of what is known about eyewitness fallibility." NANCY
STEBLAY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE ILLINOIS LINEUP DATA 6 (May 3, 2006), available at
http://web.augsburg.edu/--steblay/ObservationsOnThelllinoisData.pdf. She also reports that
"[Hennepin County]'s conclusion is that the blind-sequential procedure is working well in Minnesota.
Acceptable suspect ID rates and lower filler rates suggest a protocol that will help to convict the guilty
and protect the innocent." Id. at 7.
The experience of the pilot project [in Hennepin County] indicates that the double-
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7. The lineup administrator should not know the identity
of the suspect.
8 °
Scientific studies show that when the lineup
administrator knows the suspect's identity in an identification
procedure, he or she can intentionally or unintentionally
cause the eyewitness to choose the suspect through verbal
and non-verbal cues. 28 1 The eyewitness is generally unaware
that the lineup administrator has influenced his or her
identification of the suspect. 2
blind sequential protocol is workable for police in both large and small departments
without undercutting the ability to solve cases. At the same time, the protocol elicits
valuable new information for the effective investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases.
Klobuchar et al., supra note 183, at 413. Commenting on the Mecklenburg Report and comments by
Wells and Steblay, several prominent psychologists remarked:
If it is the case that the better outcome from the non-blind/simultaneous
procedure is partly or entirely attributable to subtle, unintentional cues provided by
the administrator, then the Illinois result may simply underscore that the present
procedure produces a biased outcome that may ultimately result in the increased
conviction of innocent individuals.
Daniel L. Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the Field, 32 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 1, 4 (2008). The State of Wisconsin also decided not to change its new eyewitness procedures
in response to the Illinois report, stating that "the design of the program does not seem to support [the]
inference or conclusion [that the higher rate of filler identification is due to the sequential procedure]."
BUREAU OF TRAINING AND STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Wis. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE TO
CHICAGO REPORT ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 3-4 (2006), available at
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/ILRptResponse.pdf. It further states that "the extensive prior
laboratory research revealing that the double-blind and sequential procedures are superior remains the
best scientific information available." Id. at 4.
280 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 862.
21 See Bradfield et al., supra note 12, at 112, 118 ("A lineup administrator who is invested in the
outcome of a witness's identification cannot be expected to have the same reaction (verbally or
nonverbally) to a filler identification that he or she has to an identification of the suspect. Even if
investigators are cautioned against giving feedback to eyewitnesses, involuntary reactions to a
witness's selection are difficult to conceal."); Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera,
Instruction Bias and Lineup Presentation Moderate the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on
Eyewitness Identification, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 70, 80 (2009) (advocating for a double-blind lineup
procedure); Taslitz, supra note 234, at 21; Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 63; see
also Ryann M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness
Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106 (2004) ("Despite research findings
showing its benefits, police are resistant to using double-blind testing because they perceive it as a loss
of control and as a suggestion that they cannot conduct fair lineups."). In a double-blind lineup, neither
the eyewitness nor the lineup administrator knows the identity of the suspect. Bradfield et al., supra
note 12, at 118. Double-blind lineups also preclude the eyewitness from looking to the lineup
administrator for clues as to the identity of the suspect or for confirmation that the eyewitness has
chosen the suspect. Id Finally, they prevent the lineup administrator from artificially increasing the
eyewitness's confidence. Id.; see infra Part VII.8. (discussing that eyewitnesses should be given
cautionary instructions).
282 See Haw & Fisher, supra note 281, at 1110 ("Witnesses were most confident when their lineup
selection confirmed the administrator's beliefs. Nevertheless, almost none of the witnesses (4.7%) or
lineup administrators (0%) were aware of the lineup administrator's influence."); Wells & Bradfield,
supra note 118, at 374 ("These data suggest that the eyewitness who is asked at trial whether the
comments of a lineup agent is influencing the way they are answering the questions at trial is in fact
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8. Eyewitnesses should be given cautionary
instructions.
28 3
The lineup administrator should provide the eyewitness
with the following cautionary instructions. First, he or she
should be told that it is just as important to clear innocent
suspects as it is to identify guilt suspects. 284 This instruction
emphasizes to the eyewitness that not identifying a lineup
participant may be the correct decision.285 Second, the
eyewitness should be advised that the perpetrator's
appearance may have changed since the crime.286 Many
physical characteristics such as hair are changeable and
perpetrators frequently alter their appearance when they
participate in an identification procedure.287 Third, the
eyewitness should be informed that the person who
committed the crime may not be in the photo array or
lineup.288 Research shows that this instruction significantly
reduces eyewitness error with a minimal reduction in correct
identification.289 Fourth, the eyewitness should be instructed
that the lineup administrator does not know the identity of the
suspect.290  This prevents the eyewitness from looking to the
unable to accurately report on that influence."). An Illinois study criticized the use of the double-blind
method, however, as previously indicated, claiming that the design of that study was seriously flawed.
See discussion supra note 279 (criticizing the Mecklenburg study for its design flaw of failing to use
double-blind administrations with both sequential and simultaneous lineups).
283 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 863.
284 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 40 ("This advice helps emphasize that failure to
identify the suspect might be, in some cases, the appropriate outcome. Clearing an innocent suspect
from suspicion can help refocus the investigation on developing other suspects.").
281 Id. at 39.
286 The National Institute of Justice notes:
Many physical characteristics are changeable. Hair, for instance, can be restyled,
colored, cut, or grown longer; facial hair can be grown or cut; and so forth.
Witnesses need to keep in mind that the suspect's appearance on these changeable
features might have been different at the time of the photo than it was at the time of
the crime.
Id.; see also Narby et al., supra note 181, at 35-36 (discussing natural and deliberate changes in a
perpetrator's appearance since the commission of the crime).287 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 40; Narby et al., supra note 181, at 35-36.
288 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 40; Taslitz, supra note 234, at 21; see also Wells et
al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 615 (finding that an instruction that the
perpetrator might or might not be present "has the effect of reducing identifications when the
perpetrator is absent from the lineup while having no effect on identifying the perpetrator when the
perpetrator is in the lineup").
289 See Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic Review
of Lineup Instruction Effects, 21 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 283, 287-94 (1997). Steblay's study aggregated
the results of twenty-two prior studies on this topic using 2588 participants. The results showed that a
cautionary instruction warning that the perpetrator may not be in the lineup reduced the rate of
erroneous identifications by forty-two percent in culprit-absent identification procedures. It reduced
the rate of accurate identifications in culprit-present identification procedures by only two percent. Id.
2" Wells supports this safeguard, arguing:
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lineup administrator for clues as to the identity of the suspect
or to confirm that he or she has chosen the suspect from the
lineup.29' Finally, the eyewitness should be advised that the
investigation will continue regardless of whether the
eyewitness makes an identification.292  This instruction
decreases the pressure on an eyewitness to make an
identification and lets the eyewitness know that the success
of the investigation does not depend on his or her
identification of the suspect.293
9. All identifications should be videorecorded.294
Videorecording of identification procedures is essential
to ensure that there is a complete, accurate record of the
identification procedures so that attorneys, judges, and jurors
can evaluate their fairness of the identification procedure.295
The person who administers the lineup should not only be blind as to which person
in the lineup is the suspect, but should also be perceived (by the eyewitness) to be
blind as to which person is the suspect. The rationale is simply to prevent
eyewitnesses from looking to the lineup administrator for cues as to which person to
select or for cues as to whether the person they selected is the "right person."
Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 630; see also Garrioch &
Brimacombe, supra note 134, at 306; Taslitz, supra note 234, at 21 ("The lineup administrator must
instruct witnesses... that they should not assume the administrator knows who is the suspect ... ").
29' Garrioch & Brimacombe, supra note 134, at 306; Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, supra note 12, at 630; see also Taslitz, supra note 234, at 21 (stating that the eyewitness
should be informed that the administrator does not know the identity of the suspect to reduce the risk of
the eyewitness guessing the suspect's identity).292 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 39.
293 Id
294 Saul M. Kassin, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: The Fifth Rule, 22 L. & HuM. BEHAV.
649, 649 (1998); Taslitz, supra note 234, at 22. Videorecording preserves any record of error or
suggestiveness:
Because. most initial identifications of criminal suspects are done with photographs
(and a large percentage of jurisdictions in the U.S. use only photographs and never
use live lineups), the discovery of any ephemeral suggestive events that were
embedded in the photographic lineup remains almost entirely dependent on the
testimony of the case detective and the witness. Often, it is unclear that the witness
and the detective who administered the photographic lineup are properly motivated
to report suggestiveness. But, even if the witness and detective are motivated to
report any suggestiveness, they would have had to explicitly notice its significance
at the time, interpret it as a suggestive event, remember it for the weeks or
sometimes months that pass before being questioned, and then articulate it to the
questioning party. The scientific psychology literature is replete with evidence
supporting the conclusion that people are poor at being able to accurately report on
the variables that influence their responses and generally think that their actions are
self-directed. The general point is there are vey good reasons to believe that the
actual prevalence of suggestiveness in eyewitness identification procedures greatly
exceeds the ability of defense counsel to prove it.
Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 58, at 16 (internal citations omitted); see also Wise et al., Tripartite
Solution, supra note 19, at 863-64 (stating that videorecording allows juries, judges, and attorneys to
evaluate the fairness of an identification procedure).295 Kassin, supra note 294, at 650.
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Moreover, the other safeguards are of dubious effectiveness
if there is no objective, complete record of how the
identification procedures were conducted.2 96  Although the
failure to videorecord a lineup should not mandate
suppression of an eyewitness's testimony, in a case where
there were no practical barriers to videorecording it, a judge
should be skeptical of police assurances that no
suggestiveness occurred. Furthermore, if the eyewitness is
allowed to testify, the judge should permit expert testimony
about the kinds of suggestiveness that might intentionally or
unintentionally occur at a lineup and should instruct the jury
that they should be cautious about relying on the testimony of
an eyewitness who made a prior identification at a lineup that
was not videorecorded.
10. "An eyewitness should make a clear statement of his
or her confidence at the time of the identification and
prior to receiving any feedback." 297
As we have seen, eyewitness confidence is the factor that
the trier of fact relies on most heavily in evaluating the
accuracy of eyewitness identification.298 Because eyewitness
confidence is highly malleable and because many factors can
increase confidence but not eyewitness accuracy, by the time
of trial, eyewitness confidence has little probative value in
assessing eyewitness accuracy.2 9  In contrast, if an
eyewitness's statement of confidence is taken immediately
after an identification of a suspect and prior to any feedback,
it generally has a moderate, positive relationship to
eyewitness accuracy, at least for those eyewitnesses who
choose a suspect °.3  Accordingly, statements of eyewitness
29 Id. at 652; Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 863-64.
297 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 864.
298Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 620.
2" Andrew E. Taslitz states:
Videotaping witness confidence statements at the time of the lineup or photo spread
discourages upward confidence drift over time, or at least enables defense counsel to
counter a witness's sincere insistence at trial of perfect confidence in his or her
earlier identification of the defendant. For similar reasons, police are urged to
obtain confidence statements from witnesses at the time that they make the
identification.
Taslitz, supra note 234, at 22-23; Wells & Bradfield, supra note 118, at 375; Wells et al., Eyewitness
Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 635; see also Klobuchar et al., supra note 183, at 390-91
(advocating for a double-blind procedure for eyewitness identifications).
300 See Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 155, 168-69 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984) (finding
that studies on eyewitness confidence generally indicate that highly confident eyewitnesses are only
somewhat more likely to make accurate identifications than less confident eyewitnesses); Wells et al.,
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confidence should be taken immediately after the eyewitness
makes an identification and before extraneous factors can
influence it.3 ' 1
11. Once a mistake is made in an identification
procedure, it cannot be corrected.
Because of the nature of memory, the effects of a
suggestive lineup procedure cannot be corrected by later
conducting a fair identification procedure.30 2
VIII. COMMON EYEWITNESS FACTORS DURING A CRIME
THAT AFFECT EYEWITNESS ACCURACY
Strong empirical evidence demonstrates that the following eyewitness
factors, which arise frequently during crimes, have a significant effect on
eyewitness accuracy. The effect of some of the eyewitness factors on
identification accuracy may appear obvious and simply a matter of
common sense. Nonetheless, because many eyewitness factors have a
counterintuitive effect on identification accuracy, we believe it is important
to include these common sense eyewitness factors as well. This list is not
comprehensive. Accordingly, judges and attorneys should consult an
eyewitness expert or the relevant scientific literature especially when
handling criminal cases where the primary or sole evidence of the
defendant's guilt is eyewitness testimony. The eyewitness factors are
divided into three types: (1) eyewitness characteristics; (2) perpetrator
characteristics; and (3) and crime characteristics.
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 12, at 626 ("The facts [sic] that eyewitness
identification confidence is given great weight by jurors, that confidence is only modestly related to
accuracy under pristine conditions, and that confidence is malleable are all matters of considerable
importance."). Although some more recent studies show that under some conditions eyewitness
confidence may have a greater relationship to eyewitness accuracy than earlier studies indicated,
researchers warn that
substantial CA [confidence accuracy] obtained in this study and in some
others ... should not be construed as evidence that the confidence witnesses display
in court predicts the accuracy of their identification testimony. Myriad social,
cognitive, and statistical factors likely greatly attenuate the CA relationship over the
months between when a crime was witnessed and when the witness testifies. It is
not to courtroom testimony to which the current findings may generalize, but rather
to initial identification decisions made in nonbiased testing situations shortly after a
witnessed event.
D. Stephen Lindsay et al., Witnessing-Condition Heterogeneity and Witnesses' Versus Investigators'
Confidence in the Accuracy of Witnesses' Identification Decisions, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 685, 695
(2000) (internal citations omitted).
301 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 39-40.
302 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 852; see also supra Parts III.A., V (discussing
the nature of eyewitness memory and why a biased identification procedure cannot be corrected by
later conducting a fair identification procedure).
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TABLE 3:
COMMON EYEwITNEss FACTORS DURING A CRIME
THAT AFFECT IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY
A. Eyewitness Characteristics
1. Child eyewitnesses
2. Elderly eyewitnesses
3. Law enforcement officers
4. Alcoholic intoxication
5. Minor details
6. Unconscious transference
B. Perpetrator Characteristics
1. Cross-race bias
2. Disguises
3. Face distinctiveness
4. Weapon focus
C. Crime Characteristics
1. Exposure time
2. Forgetting curve and retention interval
3. Lighting
4. Stress
A. Eyewitness Characteristics
1. Child Eyewitnesses
When asked open-ended questions, children provide reasonably
accurate accounts of crime though they provide less information and
somewhat less accurate information than adults.303 Young children are
more likely than adults to be influenced by suggestion, peer pressures, and
other social influences. 304 Therefore, it is essential with a child eyewitness
not to use suggestive questioning, repeated questioning, praise or rewards
for desired answers, criticism or disapproval for unfavorable responses, or
provide other forms of post-event information to the child.3 °5
Children are also about as accurate as adults at making identifications
303 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 183.
304 1d; see also Joanna D. Pozzulo, Person Description and Identification by Child Witnesses, in 2
HANDBOOK OF EYEWrrNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 283, 296 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al.
eds., 2007) (stating that children are more eager to please the interviewer than adults and so they are
more likely to give answers that they think the interviewer wants them to give than adults).
305 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 183.
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provided the perpetrator is present in the identification procedure.3 °6 If the
perpetrator is absent from the lineup, however, children make more
erroneous eyewitness identifications because of their greater
suggestibility.0 7
2. Elderly Eyewitnesses
Like children, elderly eyewitnesses perform nearly as well as young
adults in identifying the perpetrator when he or she is present in the
lineup.30 8 Thus age appears to have little effect on the accuracy of
recognition memory.30 9 When a lineup does not contain the perpetrator,
however, like children, they make more mistaken identifications than
young adults.310  Elderly adults also appear to recall fewer details about a
crime than young adults.311 Some of this difference may, however, may be
a product of elder adults' greater caution and less confidence than young
adults in their ability to recall the facts of a crime.312
3. Law Enforcement Officers
Although law enforcement officers are more skilled than lay
eyewitnesses at remembering the details or a crime, studies indicate they
are not better than lay eyewitnesses at identifying the perpetrator of a
306 See id.; see also Pozzulo, supra note 304, at 302 ("On a positive note, children as young as 5
years old can accurately identify a guilty suspect from a simultaneous lineup at the same rate as
adults.").
307 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 183; see also Pozzulo, supra note 304, at 302 ("Unfortunately, in
those cases where police have arrested an innocent suspect, children, even over 12 years of age, are
more likely than adults to make an identification of an innocent person.").
308 James C. Bartlett & Amina Memon, Eyewitness Memory in Young and Older Adults, in 2
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 309, 333 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al.
eds., 2007) ("Within the lineup task, age-related deficits in correct rejections of target-absent lineups
are larger and more consistent than age-related deficits in correct identifications from target-present
lineups, a finding in line with a good deal of evidence from standard laboratory paradigms.").
309 BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 92, at 250. There is a limited amount of research on elderly
eyewitnesses. Thus, some of the present conclusions may have to be revised or modified as more
research is conducted. Id.; see also Kassin et al., supra note 117, at 408 tbl.l, 411, 412 tbl.4 (noting
that only fifty percent of the sixty-four eyewitness experts in their survey agreed with the eyewitness
statement that "elderly eyewitnesses are less accurate than are younger adults").
310 Kassin et al., supra note 117, at 412.
311 See BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 92, at 250-51 ("Older subjects do appear to be less adept
at free recall of an incident than younger adults; a finding also reported for children."). One study
found:
Where straightforward comparisons have been made between different age
groups, young adults have been found to be significantly superior to old adults in
their accuracy of recall for perpetrator characteristics, environmental details, and
details of actions and events. This applies to both free recall (where the witness
provides a narrative account from his or her own perspective) and to cued recall
(where the witness responds to interviewer questions...
Bartlett & Memon, supra note 308, at 312 (citations omitted).
312 See BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 92, at 251.
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313
crime. This result occurs because though people can be trained to give
more detailed accounts of crimes, their ability to identify faces cannot be
improved.314
4. Alcoholic Intoxication and Marijuana Use
Victims and eyewitnesses are frequently intoxicated when a crime is
committed.315 The limited research available on intoxicated
eyewitnesses 316 indicates that alcohol primarily reduces memory for the
details of a crime and the ability of an eyewitness to identify the
perpetrator by interfering with his or her ability to perceive and encode the
crime rather than by affecting retrieval. a 7 In other words, though an
313 See Brigham et al., supra note 90, at 16 (stating that research has failed to show that officers
are better at identifying faces than ordinary citizens); Deffenbacher, supra note 102, at 379 ("Police...
may even have a pronounced bias to identify someone from a lineup."). For example:
Yuille has shown that although both police trainees and veteran officers do not recall
more correct sequential action facts that [sic] do lay persons, they do recall more
correct descriptive facts about persons and scene details, and are more resistant to
the effects of suggestion concerning salient details, at least.
Id. at 380 (internal citations omitted).
314 Id. at 379; Narby et al., supra note 181, at 30.
3' See Jennifer E. Dysart et al., The Intoxicated Witness: Effects of Alcohol on Identification
Accuracy from Showups, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 170, 170 (2002) ("Given the frequency of criminal
activity in alcohol-abundant environments, understanding the possible effects of alcohol on eyewitness
memory is critical."); Narby et al., supra note 181, at 40 ("Evidence from police files suggests that
intoxicating substances, particularly alcohol, go hand in hand with many crimes. Both perpetrators and
witnesses are often intoxicated at the time of the event." (internal citation omitted)); Sal A. Soraci et al.,
Psychological Impairment, Eyewitness Testimony, and False Memories: Individual Differences, in 1
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR EVENTS 261, 282 (Michael P. Toglia et al.
eds., 2007) ("The question itself is also relevant because it is well known that events of forensic
importance, indeed the majority of violent assaults and other crimes, very often occur in the context of
substances that alter psychological and physiological processes of perpetrators, victims, and witnesses."
(citations omitted)).316 See BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 92, at 242; Soraci et al., supra note 315, at 282
("However, the psychological literature on the effects of these substances on recollections of complex
events is sparse, and, as a result, the specific memorial consequences of the ingestion of most drugs are
not well understood.").317 See BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 92, at 242 (noting that ninety percent of the sixty-four
eyewitness experts in Kassin's survey agree with the following statement: "Alcoholic intoxication
impairs an eyewitness later ability to recall persons and events."); Kassin et al., supra note 117, at 408
tbl.1, 412 tbl.4. Laboratory research has shown that
alcohol consumption inhibits the encoding process when administered beforehand
and thereby impairs subsequent recall of information. However, research has been
somewhat limited in examining the influence of alcohol or drug usage on the
accuracy or completeness of eyewitness descriptions. One of the few empirical
studies examining the effect of alcohol consumption on witness recall was
conducted by Yuille and Tollestrup. In general, the authors found that consumption
of alcohol significantly impaired participants' ability to recall details (in both
frequency and accuracy of recall) of the event and/or target person, regardless of
whether the participant recalled immediately (and under the continued influence of
alcohol) or I week later. Read, Yuille, and Tollestnup subsequently found similar
effects. In his archival analysis, Sporer also found that when witnesses had
consumed alcohol they were less able to report details about the perpetrator's
appearance.
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intoxicated eyewitness will remember less about the crime and the
perpetrator, the information an intoxicated eyewitness recalls about a crime
tends to be almost as accurate as that recalled by a sober eyewitness. 18
Because the intoxicated eyewitness remembers less about a crime, he or
she is more likely to make an erroneous identification than a sober
eyewitness when the perpetrator is not present in the photo array or
lineup.
319
Furthermore, intoxicated eyewitnesses may be more susceptible to
suggestion and post-event information than sober eyewitnesses.320
Accordingly, it may be especially important to avoid suggestion and post-
event information when questioning eyewitnesses who were intoxicated at
the time of the crime.32' Finally, one study suggested that if an intoxicated
eyewitness experiences a high degree of stress or arousal during the crime,
this tends to reduce the negative effects of moderate levels of alcohol
consumption on eyewitness memory.322
Only one study has assessed the effects of marijuana on eyewitness
testimony. The results indicated that when marijuana is consumed in
moderation, its effects on memory appear to be fairly small and
temporary.
323
Christian A. Meissner et al., Person Descriptions as Eyewitness Evidence, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 3, 11 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007) (internal
citations omitted); see also Narby et al., supra note 181, at 41 ("Empirical evidence supports the
importance of alcohol consumption as a variable that affects both the quality and quantity of recall, as
well as affecting identification tasks."); J. Don Read et al., Recollections of a Robbery: Effects of
Arousal and Alcohol upon Recall and Person Identification, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 425, 434 (1992)
("With rare exception alcohol has been demonstrated not to impair retrieval processes and, in this
context, an effect of alcohol expectancy upon retrieval alone would be surprising."); Soraci et al., supra
note 315, at 285 ("For the most part, investigations of the effects of drugs on memory have focused on
the encoding and storage stages, rather than retrieval. The reason is simple: the largest effects of drugs
are observed at these stages.").
31 John C. Yuille & Patricia A. Tollestrup, Some Effects of Alcohol on Eyewitness Memory, 75 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 268, 271 (1990) ("The accuracy of the information recalled was high in both
alcohol and control groups, although slightly lower when alcohol was consumed.").
319 For example, a study found the following:
In the target-absent conditions, participants in the low-blood-alcohol-level
condition were more likely to make a correct rejection (.78) than were those in the
high-blood-alcohol-level condition (.48). In the target-present conditions,
participants in the high-blood-alcohol-level group were as likely to make a correct
identification (.62) as participants in the low-blood-alcohol-level group (.68).
Dysart et al., supra note 315, at 173 (internal citations omitted); see also Yuille & Tollestrup, supra
note 318, at 272 ("Alcohol had no effect on the ability of witnesses to identify correctly a picture of the
thief I week later. However, alcohol did influence the number of incorrect choices when the thief's
picture was not included in the photospread.").
320 Soraci et al., supra note 315, at 288 ("Finally, it is likely that individuals who have consumed
alcohol may be less resistant to the effects of suggestion and post-event information. If true, more
precautions need to be taken during their interviews and interrogation.").
321 Id.
32 See id. at 287 (stating that there is "some support for the lay idea that fear or stress can serve to
'sober up' someone who has been drinking, at least at moderate levels of consumption").
323 John C. Yuille et al., An Exploration on the Effects of Marijuana on Eyewitness Memory, 21
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY, 117, 124 (1998).
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5. Minor Details
A witness's ability to recall minor or peripheral details about a crime is
324
not related to identification accuracy. In fact, an eyewitness's memory
for minor or peripheral details of a crime is inversely related to eyewitness
accuracy because an eyewitness who attends to peripheral details has fewer
cognitive resources available to encode the perpetrator's face.325
6. Unconscious Transference326
Eyewitnesses sometimes identify as the perpetrator a bystander to the
crime or an individual they saw in a different context or situation.3 27 For
example, an eyewitness who viewed a mug-shot of a suspect who later
appears in a lineup may identify the suspect as the perpetrator of a crime
even though the suspect is innocent.328 Accordingly, it is always important
for law enforcement officials to determine prior to conducting an
identification procedure whether the eyewitness saw the suspect before or
after the crime.329
B. Perpetrator Characteristics
1. Cross-Race Bias
330
Eyewitnesses make more accurate identifications of perpetrators of
their own race than other races.
331
324 Gary L. Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications? Using Memory for Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
682, 684 tbl.1 (1981).
325 Id
326 This Article uses the term "unconscious transference" to refer to a specific type of source
monitoring error that occurs when the eyewitness misidentifies as the perpetrator of a crime a bystander
to a crime or a person they saw in another situation or context (e.g., identify an innocent suspect in a
lineup as the perpetrator because they previously saw the suspect's mug-shot). See discussion supra
Part HI.D. (concerning the source monitoring error and its contribution to erroneous eyewitness
testimony).
327 COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 178.
328 See Brown et al., supra note 254, at 315-16; Koehnken et al., supra note 130, at 217; see also
discussion supra Part llI.C. This error may occur because the suspect in the lineup looks familiar since
the eyewitness earlier examined his or her mugshot. See discussion supra Part III.C. In short, the
eyewitness makes a source monitoring error and concludes that the familiarity of the suspect in the
lineup results from the eyewitness having observed the suspect commit the crime rather than because
he or she previously saw the suspect's mugshot. See discussion supra Part llI.D. (regarding the source
monitoring error).
329 See discussion supra Part VII.2. (regarding the importance of determining whether an
eyewitness has seen the suspect before or after the crime).
330 The term "bias" as used here does not mean racial animosity; rather, as many scientific studies
show, it means a person of a particular race is likely to be better at identifying a perpetrator of his or
her own race than he or she would be if the perpetrator was of a different race.331 See Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race
Bias in Memory for Faces, A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 21 (2001).
Meissner and Brigham found in a study that the probability of a mistaken identification is 1.56 times
greater when a witness makes an other-race identification than when a witness makes a same-race
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2. Disguises
Even simple disguises such as a hat can make it significantly more
difficult for an eyewitness to make an accurate identification.132 A hat
decreases eyewitness accuracy because it conceals the perpetrator's hair
and facial shape, which are important cues to identifying a person.33a
3. Face Distinctiveness
Distinctive faces (e.g., faces that are highly attractive or unattractive)
are more likely to be recognized than faces that are non-distinctive.334
4. Weapon Focus
The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness's ability to accurately
identify the perpetrator's face.335 This occurs because the eyewitness tends
to focus on the weapon, which leaves less attention available to the
identification. Id. at 15. If this experimental finding carries over to real cases, then an innocent
African-American suspect has a fifty-six percent greater chance of being misidentified by a Caucasian
than an African-American eyewitness. See John C. Brigham et al., The Influence of Race on
Eyewitness Memory, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 257, 257-
58 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2006) ("The cross-race effect (CRE), also known as the own-race
bias or other race-effect, refers to the consistent finding that adults are able to recognize individuals of
their own race better than faces of another, less familiar race."); Narby et al., supra note 181, at 42
("[T]here is little doubt that the own-race bias in recognition is reliable and appreciable in magnitude,
but the theoretical underpinnings of the effect are elusive.").332 Narby, Cutler, and Penrod made such a finding:
In our own research, we examined the effects of masking a target's hair cues on
subsequent identification accuracy. In these experiments, participants viewed a
videotaped robbery and later attempted an identification from a line-up parade. In
half of the robberies the robber wore a knit pullover cap that covered his hair and
hairline. In the other half, the robber did not wear a hat. In these experiments
identification accuracy was appreciably reduced for subjects exposed to disguised
targets. For example, in one of the experiments, 45% of the participants gave
correct judgments on the line-up test if the robber wore no hat during the robbery,
but only 27% gave a correct judgment if the robber wore the hat during the robbery.
Narby et al., supra note 181, at 35 (citations omitted); see also Patterson & Baddeley, supra note 101,
at 416; Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 101, at 145; Wells & Olson, supra note 13, at 281.
333 Brian L. Cutler et al., Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: Putting Context
Into Context, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 635 (1987); Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of
Eyewitness Identification, The Role of System and Estimator Variables, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 240
(1987).
334 Narby et al., supra note 181, at 34; Wells & Olson, supra note 13, at 281.
... See Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Some Facts About "Weapon Focus," 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 55
(1987). In one study:
[S]ubjects who viewed a simulated armed robbery spent more time looking at the
weapon than control subjects who saw a virtually identical scene involving a check.
They made more eye fixations on the gun, and those fixations were of longer
duration. One consequence was a reduced ability to recognize the individual
holding the weapon. In the second experiment, subjects who saw the event
containing a weapon were not only less likely than controls to accurately identify the
perpetrator, but they were less accurate when they answered specific questions about
him.
Id. at 61; see also Kerri L. Pickel, Unusualness and Threat as Possible Causes of "Weapon Focus," 6
MEMORY 277, 278 (1998); Steblay, supra note 101, at 416.
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eyewitness to observe the perpetrator's face.336
C. Crime Characteristics
1. Exposure Time
The less time an eyewitness has to witness a crime, the less
information the eyewitness will remember about it.337 In general, however,
the time an eyewitness has to view the crime is not as important as the type
or amount of attention the eyewitness paid to the crime.338  "Indeed, a
meta-analysis of facial recognition studies found that 'quality of viewing,'
which focused centrally on the type of attention that participants paid to the
face . . was the most important determinant of facial identification
performance. 339
3 36 See COSTANZO, supra note 1, at 178; Meissner et al., supra note 317, at 10 ("[S]tudies of the
'weapon focus' effect have generally demonstrated a significant influence of the presence of a weapon
on person description accuracy." (internal citation omitted)).
33 See Meissner et al., supra note 317, at 9 ("Yarmey, Jacob, and Porter conducted a study in
which participants interacted with a target person for 5 seconds or 30 seconds and were subsequently
asked to describe the encounter. As expected, their results indicated that person descriptions... were
superior when participants had a longer time to observe the target person." (internal citation omitted));
see also Narby et al., supra note 181, at 37 ("Although some investigations show a linear increase in
face recognition accuracy with exposure time, others show a logarithmic relationship. That is, as
exposure duration increases, face recognition accuracy improves, but the improvements become
smaller at long durations. This finding was supported in the Shapiro and Penrod meta-analysis."
(internal citations omitted)).
The first of the Biggers criteria is the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime. This post-dictor concerns both quantity and
quality of view. Intuitively, jurors should be confident in eyewitnesses who had
long and unobstructed views of the criminals. Much work in facial recognition has
shown that one aspect of the opportunity to view the criminal, namely, increasing
the amount of time a person views another individual's face, leads to boosts in
recognition accuracy. However, two caveats apply to these findings. First, facial
recognition studies have tended to assess memory with the exact same photographs
that the person originally studied. More recent experiments have shown that using
different and dissimilar photographs reduces the impact of exposure time on
recognition accuracy.
Second, at times, the only way to gauge how much time a witness had to view
the culprit is to ask the witness to estimate it. People, unfortunately, tend to
overestimate the duration of events.
Deanna D. Caputo & David Dunning, Distinguishing Accurate Eyewitness Identification from
Erroneous Ones: Post-Dictive Indicators of Eyewitness Accuracy, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 427-29 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2006) (internal citations
omitted).
338 Caputo & Dunning, supra note 337, at 429 ("There are many different ways that witnesses can
attend to a culprit, and the seriousness and depth of this attention can influence identification accuracy
in significant ways."); see also Wells & Olson, supra note 13, at 282 ("In general, the amount of time a
culprit's face is in view is not as critical for eyewitness identification accuracy as the type or amount of
attention given by the witness.").
339 Caputo & Dunning, supra note 337, at 429. Making physical determinations about a
perpetrator's appearance does not necessarily lead to an accurate identification. If witnesses make
abstract judgments about a perpetrator's appearance, they tend to more clearly recall that perpetrator
later on.
As would be expected, the amount of time a culprit's face is in view affects the
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2. Forgetting Curve and Retention Interval
Research has demonstrated that memory loss for a crime or other event
is highest immediately after the crime occurs and then slows over time. 3t °
Accordingly, eyewitness interviews and identification procedures should
be conducted as soon as possible after a crime.
3. Lighting
Poor lighting conditions negatively impact an eyewitness's ability to
make an accurate identification.341
4. Stress
Very high levels of stress during a crime impair eyewitness
accuracy.342 Scientific research shows that different levels of stress can
have multiple, sometimes subtle, effects on eyewitness memory. As stress
increases, a tunnel memory effect is likely to occur.343 This effect causes
some information, such as a weapon, to be vividly remembered while
causing other information, such as the color of a perpetrator's shirt, to be
poorly recalled.3" Moreover, very high levels of stress are likely to cause
a major deterioration in memory. 345  High levels of stress tend to
substantially impair eyewitness memory because the stress activates the
eyewitness's fight or flight response, which interferes with the
chances that the eyewitness can identify the person later. However, this relationship
depends less critically on the eyewitness's opportunity to view per se and more on
the amount and type of attention that the witness directs at the culprit Given equal
exposure time to a face, people are more likely to be able to recognize that face later
if they make abstract inferences about it... (e.g., does this person have a large or
small nose?). Presumably, this effect occurs because the abstract inferences require
holistic processing of the face whereas the physical judgments require feature
processing.
Wells & Olson, supra note 13, at 282 (internal citations omitted).
340 See Caputo & Dunning, supra note 337, at 432 ("Studies looking at memory decay over time
have shown that memory for unfamiliar faces does decrease over time. Indeed, the amount of decay
tends to be far greater than people expect. As a consequence, identifications after a significant delay
can be quite problematic." (internal citations omitted)); Deffenbacher, supra note 102, at 380; Meissner
et al., supra note 317, at 11-12 ("For example, Ellis, Shepherd, and Davies had participants describe
one face immediately after viewing it, and another either 1 hour, the next day, or I week following
exposure. Participants remembered significantly fewer details after I week compared with the two
shorter retention intervals .... (internal citation omitted)).
341 See Wells & Olson, supra note 13, at 282 ("Clearly, at the extreme of low light levels there is a
point at which a face cannot be perceived well enough to be recognized later.").
342 See Deffenbacher et al., supra note 102, at 699 (noting that the authors' meta-analysis
supported the hypothesis that high levels of stress negatively affect both identification accuracy and the
eyewitness's ability to recall crime details).
343 See Martin A. Safer et al., Tunnel Memory for Traumatic Events, 12 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 99, 99-100 (1998) (explaining that "tunnel vision" refers to a narrowing of attention to
particular aspects of a situation, which often occurs in stressful situations).
3 
ad,
343 See Deffenacher et al., supra note 102, at 699.
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eyewitness's ability to pay attention and process information.34 6
X. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS AT TRIAL
The previously discussed scientific findings about eyewitness
testimony also support several changes in current practices for when
eyewitness identifications should be admitted at trial. These changes
include the following:
1. If a pretrial identification was made at a procedure that
included significant risk of contamination,347 the prosecutor
should not be permitted to introduce evidence of it at trial, 48
unless the use of that procedure was prompted by
investigative necessity.
349
2. A prosecutor should be precluded from offering evidence
of a subsequent pretrial identification by the eyewitness
whose memory has been contaminated at an earlier
procedure, even if the later identification procedure was fair
and nonsuggestive.35°
3. Where significant risk of contamination occurred, the
judge should preclude the eyewitness from making an in-
court identification unless the prosecutor persuades the judge
that the identification will be the product of the eyewitness's
memory of the crime, unaffected by the contamination.35'
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the trial judge has a
3 See WErrEN, supra note 14, at 289-90.
37 Perfection cannot be demanded or expected, but courts should insist that the police or
prosecution avoid substantial bias or suggestiveness in their procedures.
348 Defense counsel should be permitted to introduce evidence of a pretrial identification
procedure that had a significant risk of contamination to show how its suggestiveness tainted the
eyewitness's trial testimony.
349 Investigative necessity may arise, for example, during a street showup: shortly after the crime,
the police apprehend someone nearby who fits the description the eyewitnesses gave of the perpetrator.
In this situation, police need to know quickly whether to arrest the suspect, or release him with
apologies and continue to search for the perpetrator. Such necessity may also arise where a key
eyewitness is too ill to attend a lineup, and a hospital-room showup is necessary. See, e.g., Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967) (noting that, to obtain an identification, the police arranged with the
surgeon of a stabbing victim to bring the alleged assailant into the victim's hospital room). The
Supreme Court acknowledged that though the procedure was exceptionally suggestive, it was
nonetheless justified by exigent circumstances, given concerns that the eyewitness-victim might die.
Id. at 302.
350 Substantial research documents that once an eyewitness's identification of a suspect has been
contaminated, the damage cannot be repaired. See Wells et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 582-
83; Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 845-47; see also supra Table 1, Step 2.B. Indeed,
the Supreme Court acknowledged this in 1967. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29
(1967).
351 For example, the prosecutor could argue that the viewing conditions were exceptionally good
because the kidnapping victim had prolonged repeated exposure to the perpetrator or the eyewitness
knew the perpetrator prior to the crime. See supra Table 1, Step 2.C.
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constitutional duty to protect against convictions based on
unreliable evidence.352 Given what is now known about the
irreparability of contaminated identifications 353  and the
frequency with which erroneous convictions are based on
contaminated identification testimony,354 a strong argument
exists to preclude any eyewitness from giving identification
testimony when a serious risk exists that contamination has
occurred 355-- even if that contamination resulted from
investigative necessity, rather than sloppy police work or
reliance on discredited procedures.
We decline to adopt that position for now. But courts must do more
than pay lip service to their responsibility of vetting the reliability of
eyewitness identifications. If a judge does permit an eyewitness to make
an in-court identification after he or she has identified the defendant at a
seriously flawed pretrial identification procedure, the judge should inform
the jury of the risks involved in the eyewitness's in-court testimony-
356either by permitting the defense to call an eyewitness expert, or by
instructing the jury that they should be cautious about accepting an
eyewitness's in-court identification where there had been a seriously
flawed pretrial identification,357 or both. Where a judge admits eyewitness
identification testimony despite a pretrial identification process that was
unnecessarily and significantly suggestive, such an instruction should
352 See discussion supra Part ll.A.2.
... See supra note 348.
354 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 229 ('[T]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying
witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor-perhaps it is
responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined.").355 See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
356 The current judicial skepticism or antagonism toward expert testimony on this subject is no
longer justified. See supra Part ll.D. Nevertheless, expert testimony is a problematic solution in many
cases, first, because there are not enough experts to provide such testimony in every case where it
would be relevant, and second, because many defendants would be unable to afford even a modest fee
for the expert. Finally, eyewitness expert testimony in its current form frequently results in increasing
juror skepticism rather than increasing juror sensitivity to the relevant eyewitness factors in a case. See
Wise et. al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 840. Accordingly, the most potent means available to
the criminal justice system to prevent eyewitness error is to conduct fair and unbiased eyewitness
interviews and identification procedures. Id. at 865.
357 As a rule, the weight to be given to any eyewitness's testimony is for the jury, not the judge, to
decide. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931); Dunbar v. United
States, 156 U.S. 185, 196 (1895); see also CLIFFORD S. FiSHMAN, JONES ON EvIDENCE §§ 3:33 (civil
cases), 5:15 (criminal cases) (7th ed. 1992); 1 JOHN WILLIAM STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EviDENCE § 328 (West Publishing Co., 4th ed. 1992); 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 995 (2004). In
criminal cases, however, it is common for the judge to admonish a jury to view certain eyewitnesses'
testimony with particular caution. Many jurisdictions, for example, require a judge to give a cautionary
instruction when an erstwhile accomplice testifies for the state against the defendant. See FISHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 76, § 5:55. Similarly, some courts permit or require a judge to give a cautionary
instruction if the eyewitness is a drug addict. 2 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 9:9 (15th ed. 1998). The same is true if the witness is a young
child. Id. § 7:16.
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include an admonition that because an eyewitness's memory and
confidence are highly malleable, an eyewitness may not be able to
accurately recall at trial (1) the quality of his or her view of the crime; (2)
the amount of attention he or she was able to pay to the crime; (3) how
much he or she remembers about the details of the perpetrator's face; (4)
his or her reason for selecting the suspect at the pretrial identification
procedure; (5) how quickly or easily he or she identified the suspect at that
procedure; (6) his or her degree of confidence in the accuracy of the
identification when the identification was made; and (7) whether the lineup
administrator influenced his or her selection of the suspect.358
X. CONCLUSION
The method described in this Article provides judges and attorneys
with a practical and comprehensive means of analyzing the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony. Defense attorneys and prosecutors can also use this
method when seeking either to bolster or attack the accuracy of eyewitness
testimony at trial. Thus, prosecutors can use it to analyze eyewitness
testimony in a case to determine the factors that likely increased the
accuracy of the eyewitness testimony. For example, they can argue at trial
that the eyewitness testimony in the case is likely to be accurate because
proper procedures were followed in conducting the eyewitness interviews
and identification procedures. In addition, the prosecutor can point out to
the trier of fact the eyewitness factors during the crime, such as good
lighting, the absence of a disguise, and the long time the eyewitness had to
observe the perpetrator, that support the likely accuracy of the eyewitness's
testimony.
This method also provides defense attorneys with a method for
systematically and comprehensively analyzing the weaknesses of the
State's eyewitness evidence. Thus, a defense attorney can specify the
factors that made the eyewitness interview and identification procedures
unfair and biased and the eyewitness factors present during the crime that
probably decreased the eyewitness's accuracy, such as a weapon, a
disguise, and a high level of stress.
In addition, this method, by emphasizing the importance of conducting
fair and unbiased eyewitness interviews and identification procedures,
exerts pressure on the legal system to take steps to improve the fairness of
358 For studies documenting these difficulties, see Wells & Bradfield, supra note 118, at 374;
Wise et. al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 869. Lawyers frequently question whether juries are
able to understand or follow cautionary or limiting instructions, and experience may prove that they are
little help in the eyewitness identification context, but use of such instructions is an experiment worth
trying-particularly where the alternatives are either categorical exclusion of a particular eyewitness's
identification testimony, on the one hand, or acquiescence in the high percentage of wrongful
convictions based on erroneous eyewitness identification testimony, on the other.
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interviews and identification procedures. Because improving the fairness
of eyewitness interviews and identification procedures is the most potent
means available to the legal system to prevent eyewitness error, this
method can encourage changes in interviews and identification procedures
that will significantly reduce eyewitness error.359  This method is also
congruent with evidentiary rules that provide that trace evidence is
admissible at trial only if the State followed proper scientific procedures in
collecting the evidence.3 °
Using this method for analyzing the accuracy of eyewitness testimony
is not limited to attorneys and judges. Law enforcement officers and jurors
can also use it to assess the likely accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
Moreover, jurors' use of this method may not only produce more accurate
assessments of eyewitness testimony, but it may also reduce the need for
eyewitness expert testimony in criminal cases and, when used in
conjunction with expert testimony, may enhance its effectiveness.36'
In applying the guidelines in this Article, it is important to remember
that researchers are continually making new discoveries about the causes
and remedies for eyewitness error. Accordingly, the guidelines and
eyewitness factors delineated in this Article will undoubtedly have to be
modified in the future to accommodate new research findings. For
example, some research has shown that certain factors, such as how
quickly an eyewitness makes an identification and the manner in which an
eyewitness identifies a suspect, may be useful indicators of eyewitness
accuracy.362 If additional research confirms the usefulness of these or other
359 Wise et al., Tripartite Solution, supra note 19, at 865.
360 FED. R. EVID. 403, 702, 901.
361 See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 169, at 114-15. As Cutler and Penrod stated, even experts
have difficulty applying their knowledge to the facts of a case. Id. The method discussed in this
Article would give jurors a means for applying the relevant eyewitness factors discussed by an
eyewitness expert to the facts of a criminal case. Therefore, it might improve the effectiveness of
expert testimony in helping jurors to assess eyewitness accuracy.
362 Caputo & Dunning, supra note 337, at 435-36. For example, Caputo and Dunning point out
that some researchers have found that eyewitnesses who make an identification of a suspect between
ten and twelve seconds after being exposed to a lineup tend to be more accurate than eyewitnesses who
take longer to make an identification. Id. at 436-37. There is, however, as they point out, other
research that has not supported this conclusion. Id at 437. "More recent research... has shown that
the 10-12 second rule is not stable across variations in witnessing and lineup conditions." Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 67. "Weber et al. found that maximally discriminating time
ranged from 5 seconds to 29 seconds across variations in conditions. Furthermore, eyewitnesses who
responded faster than the optimal time boundaries did not show particularly high probabilities of being
accurate ...." Id. at 67-68 (citations omitted). Research has also indicated that eyewitnesses tend to
be more accurate when their identifications are "automatic and absolute" rather than "conscious,
effortful, and relative." Caputo & Dunning, supra note 337, at 434. Identifications are automatic when
an eyewitness makes the identification without any conscious effort. Id. "Absolute" means that the
eyewitness made the identification because the suspect matched their memory of the perpetrator of the
crime rather than choosing the suspect because he or she most closely resembles the perpetrator. Wells
et al., From the Lab, supra note 15, at 585-86. As Caputo and Dunning point out, however, the
determination of the manner in which an eyewitness makes an identification can be difficult to
accurately assess because self-reports of the method used to make an identification are frequently
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post-dictors in a wide array of eyewitness conditions, they can be
incorporated into the present method for analyzing eyewitness accuracy. 63
The method discussed in this Article also suggests that there needs to
be a paradigm shift in the thinking of law enforcement and prosecutors
about eyewitness testimony. Law enforcement frequently conducts
eyewitness interviews and identification procedures in a manner that
unintentionally contaminates the eyewitness's memory of the crime and
impairs the eyewitness's ability to identify the perpetrator of the crime. In
addition, eyewitnesses often observe crimes under poor eyewitness
conditions. 364  Because of these limitations in many criminal cases, this
method indicates that the State needs to minimize the number of criminal
cases that it brings where the sole or primary evidence of the defendant's
guilt is eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, in criminal cases that rely
heavily on eyewitness testimony for proof of the defendant's guilt, the
State needs to be especially careful that its eyewitness interviews and
identification procedures are fair and unbiased and that the eyewitness
conditions during the crime were conducive to an accurate identification.
This method also suggests that law enforcement and prosecutors need
to pay more attention to instances where an eyewitness either misidentifies
a filler in a lineup as the perpetrator or determines that the perpetrator is
not in the lineup. Such misidentifications and non-identifications
frequently provide useful information that should cause law enforcement
and prosecutors to consider the possibility that the suspect is innocent
rather than elicit a reflexive response that the eyewitness made an error.365
inaccurate. "It has long been known that people are notoriously unskilled at accurately describing how
they reach their decisions. In the eyewitness context, researchers have observed participants comparing
photographs, only to be told by participants later that no comparison had occurred." Caputo &
Dunning, supra note 337, at 436 (citations omitted); Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13,
at 68.
Overall, it appears that postdiction has not been highly successful for eyewitness
identification .... This underscores the primary message of the system-variable
approach-namely, that it would be better to use procedures that help prevent
mistaken identifications from occurring in the first place than to try to detect errors
after the fact.
Id. This is another reason why the present method for assessing eyewitness accuracy discussed in this
Article emphasizes the importance of law enforcement conducting fair and unbiased eyewitness
interviews and identification procedures.
363 If additional empirical research establishes that these or other postdictors are useful and
practical indicators of eyewitness accuracy, they could be incorporated into the current method by
evaluating them after the fairness of the eyewitness interview and identification procedures are
examined and before assessing the eyewitness factors during the crime that may have affected
identification accuracy.
364 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 13, at 45 ("Many of the experiments
conducted in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s resulted in articles by psychologists . . .
[explaining that] the validity of eyewitness reports depends a great deal on the procedures that are used
to obtain those reports and that the legal system was not using the best procedures.").
365 See Caputo & Dunning, supra note 337, at 438 ("Depending on the circumstances ... positive
identification of [an irrelevant] distractor [in a lineup might actually be worthwhile] evidence that the
suspect is innocent."); see also Steve Charman & Gary L. Wells, Applied Lineup Theory, in 2
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The most egregious error any legal system can make is to convict an
innocent defendant. Moreover, a wrongful conviction is not just a tragedy
for the innocent defendant and his or her family, but also for the victims of
crimes that occur because the true perpetrator of a crime was never brought
to justice. Wrongful convictions also undermine the credibility of a legal
system, especially when it fails to implement safeguards that could help
prevent them.36  By using the method described in this Article for
analyzing the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, judges and attorneys can
take a major step in reducing the number of wrongful convictions from
eyewitness error.
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 219 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds.,
2006). "For example, it is quite possible that criminal investigators too readily dismiss
nonidentifications for their exonerating qualities while readily accepting identifications of the suspect
for their incriminating qualities." Id. at 220-21. "When properly designed and interpreted, a lineup
procedure has not only incriminating powers, but exonerating powers as well. In fact, there is clear
proof using mathematical formulations that any lineup that has incriminating value from the
identification of the suspect must also have exonerating value from a nonidentification." Id. at 222.
36 As Risinger explains:
When the wrongful conviction is the product of an official inquiry by a court even in
a petty criminal or quasi-criminal context, it not only imposes pain that has a moral
claim to our recognition, but it is also seriously corrosive to the respect for law of
the wronged individuals, and that of all those around them who believe the
convicted were in fact innocent.
Risinger, supra note 11, at 789.
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APPENDIX
FORM FOR EVALUATING THE ACCURACY
OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
I. EYEWITNESS INTERVIEW
(Evaluate separately each interview of an eyewitness.)
A. Factors that Indicate the Interview Was Complete, Fair, and Did
Not Increase Eyewitness Confidence
1. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Obtained the
Maximum Amount of Information from the Eyewitness
2. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Was Fair and Did
Not Contaminate the Eyewitness's Memory of the Crime
3. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Did Not Increase
Eyewitness Confidence
B. Factors that Indicate the Interview Was Incomplete, Biased, and
Increased the Eyewitness's Confidence
1. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Did Not Obtain the
Maximum Amount of Information from the Eyewitness
2. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Was Biased and
Contaminated the Eyewitness's Memory of the Crime
3. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Increased the
Eyewitness's Confidence
II. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
(Conduct a separate analysis for each identification procedure.)
A. List Factors that Indicate the Identification Procedure Was Fair
and Impartial
B. List Factors that Indicate the Identification Procedure Was
Biased
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C. If the interviews and identification procedures were substantially
fair and unbiased or an exception applies (e.g., the eyewitness
knew the perpetrator prior to the crime or had prolonged,
repeated exposure to the perpetrator, or there is reliable, valid
corroborating evidence of the accuracy of the eyewitness
testimony), go on to Part III. If an interview or an identification
procedure was significantly unfair and biased, and no exception
applies, the eyewitness testimony or any subsequent
identification of the defendant by the eyewitness has no
probative value and should not be considered in the
determination of the defendant's guilt.
III. EYEWITNESS FACTORS DURING THE CRIME THAT LIKELY
AFFECTED IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY
A. List Eyewitness Factors During the Crime that Likely Increased
Eyewitness Accuracy
B. List Eyewitness Factors During the Crime that Likely Decreased
Eyewitness Accuracy
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. Was the maximum amount of information obtained from the
eyewitness during the interviews?
1. Yes 2. No
B. Was a statement of the eyewitness's confidence in the accuracy
of the identification obtained prior to any feedback?
1. Yes 2. No
C. Is there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewitness
testimony was accurate?
1. High 2. Medium 3. Low
D. Is there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewitness
identification was accurate?
1. High 2. Medium 3. Low
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2. Medium 3. Low1. High

